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It is becoming increasingly clear that donors need to work more effectively in 
fragile states (understood as those states where the government cannot, or 
will not, deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor). 
DFID has been working to understand how aid can be increased and 
improved in these environments, and in particular which aid instruments offer 
promise for meeting immediate needs, supporting pro-poor political reform, 
and developing sustainable systems for delivering services and social 
protection. This note summarises the following paper on aid instruments, it will 
describe: 
 
   the limitations of the current approach to the selection of aid 
instruments in fragile states;  
   the emerging understanding about the use of aid instruments in fragile 
states; 
   a selection of aid instruments that appear to offer promise for achieving 
a range of objectives in fragile states; 




Limitations of the current approach to the selection of instruments 
 
The current standard approach to the selection of aid instruments in fragile 
states emphasises that: 
 
   funds should be restricted; 
   most should be disbursed as projects, in particular NGO and 
humanitarian projects, as this offers donors a way of working ‘around’ 
the state;  
   there should be a shorter time commitment; 
   technical assistance can be used as a way of persuading governments 
to improve polices; 
   that as states move along the notional spectrum from poor to good 
performance, there should be a shift by donors away from projects and 
towards budget support; 
   that alignment is not realistic without strong government leadership and 
capacity; and the more limited goal of donor coordination, rather than 
harmonisation, is all that is possible. 
 
 
This model is, in effect, the reverse of the current consensus for selecting 
instruments in ‘good performers’. It has some value as a default, risk-
reducing, starting point. However, it does not provide a strong enough basis 
for meeting the policy challenge of working more effectively in fragile states: 
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   There are, in fact, an increasing number of examples of the successful 
use of aid instruments contrary to this approach.  
 
    It does not capture the wide variety of situations in fragile states, and 
so of opportunities for innovative programming. Its assumptions about 
change are too linear, and it relies on an overly simplistic ‘state/non-
state’ understanding of implementation and absorptive capacity.  
 
   It does not reflect recent research and understanding of aid 
effectiveness. In particular, it does not accommodate the possibility that 
aid could be a cost-effective means of preventing conflict and further 
instability, nor the negative consequences of instability for neighbouring 
countries. It also assumes absorptive capacity is limited to 
governments, and does not include other actors.  
 
 
Towards an improved approach to the selection of aid instruments 
 
An improved approach to the selection of aid instruments is needed. The 
working paper emphasises that: 
 
There is no single approach: Fragile state contexts are too varied, and 
opportunities are too specific; instruments ‘behave’ very differently in different 
contexts and development actors should avoid ‘one size fits all’ proscriptions 
such as  ‘budget support is inappropriate in fragile states’ or ‘civil society 
organisations are the answer’. Experience in a growing number of cases 
shows that a long-term commitment, a focus on context and policy objectives, 
and an imaginative and flexible use of various instruments, can have a 
significant impact on poverty reduction.   
 
Risk can be reduced, but not eliminated: Concerns over state legitimation and 
fiduciary risk will continue to be a strong determinant of the choice and 
balance of aid instruments in fragile states. For this reason, instruments that 
limit state control and fiduciary risk – such as humanitarian aid, technical 
cooperation and projects – will remain key. Minimum conditions for budget 
support will typically not be fulfilled. However, trust funds, pooled funding and 
social funds are being used in innovative ways that can manage these 
concerns, and also meet other objectives such as meeting immediate needs, 
institutional development, and political change. An approach is needed that 
acknowledges high risk, but also the possibility of high returns. 
 
Think nationally and programmatically, not in terms of projects: Rather than 
thinking in terms of ‘scaling up’ from a series of local, often short-term and 
projectised approaches, it is important to think and plan long-term and 
programmatically from the outset, and then work out implementation 
methodologies. The National Priority Programmes in Afghanistan, for 
example, are based on national plans, with implementation through 
government, NGOs, and private sector, depending on what is available.  
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Programme implementation will involve many actors, state and non-state: 
Programme implementation will typically involve partnerships between state, 
UN, civil society and the private sector, not one or the other; this makes 
programmes complex, but flexible. It is not possible to ‘avoid’ the state, and 
anyway not sensible if the long-term goal is to rebuild it. Interventions should 
be seen as having differing degrees of alignment with the state, rather than an 
all or nothing approach. Programmatic approaches, as above, are more likely 
to be successfully absorbed by the state at some time in the future than 
localised and projectised approaches, in particular if programmes are 
designed with this in mind. As the Burma HIV/AIDS programme shows, it is 
possible to engage with the state even in the most inauspicious 
circumstances.  
 
Improved coherence requires better frameworks.  Greater coherence between 
security, development and diplomatic interventions is necessary to ensure 
impact on poverty reduction, particularly where aid may be less significant for 
donor states than their military and political interventions. This will require 
better thought through and more standardised strategic frameworks. 
Frameworks such as Consolidated Action Plans and Transition Result Action 
Matrices have been developed to prioritise and plan donor interventions in the 
absence of developed state planning structures, such as national 
development plans and budgets. The choice of framework is closely related to 
the nature of aid instruments. But frameworks are often too ad hoc, too 
unrelated, and there is often competition between institutions as they 
champion different approaches. 
 
General principles of aid effectiveness should also be applied to fragile states. 
Coordination is no substitute for harmonisation and alignment. A number of 
instruments, notably multi-donor trust funds and pooled funding for joint 
programmes, offer more opportunities for greater levels of harmonisation, 
predictability, and where possible alignment, than are often achieved. The 
Zimbabwe multi-year Protracted Relief programme, for example, aims to 
ensure predictability through multi-year funding. The idea of ‘shadow 
alignment’ – working with parallel but state-compatible planning and budgeting 
systems – is emerging as a promising donor strategy to minimise state 
legitimation in difficult development partnerships. Where alignment is not 
possible, selectivity, sequencing and harmonisation of activities is important.  
 
Supporting political reform is difficult, but possible: The choice of instruments 
should be based on broader political strategies and a political economy 
analysis of potential winners and losers. Budget support though a trust fund in 
Afghanistan, for example, supported the legitimacy of a weak government 
after the Taliban and supported the restoration of state systems and capacity 
development. 
 
Experiment: Working in fragile states requires experimentation and flexibility 
based on local knowledge. Many of the most interesting instruments now 
being used have evolved through several cycles of reform and adaptation. 
This requires a long-term commitment, good monitoring and evaluation, 
money, and above all dedicated staff. Donors need to adjust human and DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  7
financial resource allocation procedures to facilitate this, such as delinking 
programme and staffing budgets. 
 
 
Some promising aid instruments in fragile states  
 
Budget Support. In countries where there is little political will to invest in and 
account for pro-poor expenditure, programme aid instruments such as budget 
support will remain inappropriate. However, budget support has been 
provided with some effect, specifically in two kinds of circumstances: (i) 
budget support via Trust Funds in the early stages of state formation (e.g. 
East Timor, Afghanistan), (ii) budget support, direct to government, in more 
established post-conflict countries with new regimes (e.g. Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone). Debt relief to countries such as Rwanda and Sierra Leone has also 
resulted in increases in poverty-reducing public expenditure. 
 
Social funds: An instrument used widely by the World Bank, social funds can 
be a very useful as way of getting money directly to communities for small 
investments, and can set up systems in many differing relations to 
government. They can strengthen local accountability and so contribute to 
broader political reform. There can be problems of linking social funds to 
government structures, for example in the development of service delivery 
systems. They can also promote harmonisation and alignment. The Yemen 
social fund has attracted £225 million for 2004 from several donors; it has 
been most successful where it has aligned with the priorities of the education 
ministry, and least successful where it has worked independently of the health 
ministry.  
 
Pooled funding: Various ways of pooling funds, such as multi-donor trust 
funds and joint programmes, offer a number of advantages. They can promote 
a more programmatic and long-term approach to, for example, service 
delivery. They reduce the tendency to projectisation and they promote 
harmonisation and, where possible, alignment. 
 
Projects  are conventionally seen as insulated instruments, best suited for 
service delivery, immune to the broader policy and institutional environment, 
and contrary to conventional principles of aid effectiveness. In fact, projects 
are almost infinitely variable in their design and in degrees of alignment to 
government systems; projects can meet a range of development objectives; 
the productivity of projects may be strongly influenced by the quality of 
policies and institutions; and projects, within a strategic framework, can 
demonstrate principles of aid effectiveness such as alignment, harmonisation 
and predictability. 
 
Humanitarian aid: There are opportunities to redesign the content of 
humanitarian aid, without undermining humanitarian principles, in order to 
make it more effective and facilitate the transition from relief to development. 
This would involve making humanitarian aid better planned and financed 
through pooled funds under UN OCHA control, and making it more demand-DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  8
led by moving away from commodity-driven interventions towards cash-




Using aid instruments in different contexts 
 
An improved understanding of the use of instruments in different contexts is 
needed, in particular their sequencing and their relationship to political 
processes. One of the main messages of DFID’s work on instruments in 
fragile states is that there is no single approach. However, taking DFID’s 
understanding of fragile states as a starting point, (i.e the notion of state 
capacity and state commitment to poverty reduction), it is possible to make 
some broad-brush suggestions for different contexts: 
 
Where there is state capacity, but no commitment to poverty reduction: 
Consider off-budget, joint, national or regional programmes with pooled 
funding, perhaps with the UN having oversight as a legitimate, neutral 
intermediary. Use humanitarian projects, but in response to humanitarian 
need. Partner with non-state actors, and state actors where possible, such as 
local government or reformist elements in central government. Shadow align 
with state systems. Support key reformers in government, perhaps with 
selective technical cooperation focusing on a few key ‘zero generation’ 
reforms. 
 
Where there is both little capacity and little commitment: Similar to above, but 
a lack of state capacity can mean there are more opportunities to work with 
local government, communities, civil society and the private sector. Focus on 
strengthening the capacity of vulnerable communities. 
 
Where there is commitment, but little capacity: Ensure an overarching 
strategic framework is in place between government and donors covering 
political, security and development strategies. Establish multi-donor trust 
funds for budget support, large investment projects, security sector reform, 
etc. Provide technical cooperation for capacity-building, but ensure it is 
government-led, not donor-led. Align behind government budgeting and 
planning by ensuring all donor projects and programmes are ‘on budget’, even 
if not ‘through budget’. Complement with social fund/social protection 
arrangements to get resources to communities and begin to build from the 
bottom up. Use direct contracting of UN and NGOs where national 
programmes are insufficient, but ‘on budget’, not ‘off budget’. DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  9
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Context of the paper 
This paper is one of a series of DFID Working Papers on increasing the 
effectiveness of development aid in fragile states.
1 International policy on 
fragile states is an issue of growing interest and concern, for DFID and for 
many other actors; fragile states are home to 16% of the world’s population, 
but 35% of the world’s poor, 44% of maternal deaths, 46% of children out of 
school, and 51% of children dying before the age of five.
2 The MDGs will not 
be achieved without significant progress in these countries. The choice and 
use of aid instruments is a key aspect of donor policy and programmes. 
 
1.2  Objectives of the paper  
The purpose of this paper is to support policy development and programmes 
in fragile states in DFID and other development agencies by contributing to a 
better understanding of the use of different aid instruments. In particular, the 
paper will review: 
 
   What kind and mix of aid instruments are being used and might be 
appropriate for difficult environments? 
   What kind and mix of aid frameworks (frameworks for planning, 
coordination and resource mobilisation) are being used and to what 
effect? 
   What are strengths and weaknesses of different aid instruments and 
frameworks in different environments and for different development 
objectives?  
 
1.3  Methodology and structure 
The paper has drawn primarily from the following sources: 
 
   general review of literature, primarily studies written by or 
commissioned by development agencies; 
   detailed review of fragile states case studies, particularly studies 
produced by the DFID Policy Division and World Bank LICUS initiative; 
   review of DFID statistics on development assistance (1993/94 – 
2003/04) and associated project documentation; 
   review of OECD / DAC statistics on development; 
   interviews with staff from DFID, other development agencies, think 
tanks and academics. 
                                            
1 The other papers in the series are: ‘Fragile states: defining difficult environments for poverty 
reduction’, Working Paper 1, ‘How important are difficult environments to achieving the MDGs?’ 
Working Paper 2, ‘Approaches to improving the delivery of social services in difficult environments’ 
Working Paper 3 and  ‘Improving the development response in difficult environments: lessons from 
DFID experience’, Working Paper 4. 
2 Based on available data for the 46 countries in the bottom 2 quintiles of the World Bank CPIA ratings 
(used here as a proxy for fragile states), see ‘How important are difficult environments to achieving the 
MDGs?’ Working Paper 2 for details. DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  10
 
The paper will initially outline a conceptual framework and criteria for 
examining the use of aid instruments and frameworks in fragile states (Section 
2); then review a number of frameworks and instruments against these criteria 
(Section 3); draw together these findings, (Section 4); and finally offer some 
answers to the questions raised above, and propose recommendations to 
guide future policy development and programmes (Section 5). 
 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1   Defining ‘instruments’, ‘frameworks’ and ‘fragile states’ 
There are many ways of defining state fragility.
3 For the purposes of this 
paper, ‘fragile states’ are understood as states that lack either the capacity, or 
the will, (or both), to deliver core state functions for the majority of their 
people, including the poor. The most important functions of the state for 
poverty reduction are territorial control, safety and security, capacity to 
manage public resources, delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect 
and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves.
4 In 
terms of development cooperation, fragile states may have little capacity to be 
effective development partners because of state collapse (e.g. Somalia), 
partial territorial control (e.g. Nepal), armed conflict (e.g. DRC, Sudan), 
political instability (e.g. Central African Republic), or dysfunctional governance 
structures (e.g. Nigeria). They may be unwilling to enter development 
partnerships because they have repressive or isolationist governments (e.g. 
Zimbabwe), or are controlled by elites with little commitment to poverty 
reduction (e.g. Angola). In this paper, the term ‘fragile state’ is used 
interchangeably with ‘poor performer’ and ‘difficult environment’. 
 
‘Instruments’ and ‘frameworks’ have been defined broadly; instruments are 
taken to be the mechanisms and procedures through which donors channel 
resources to fragile states, and include, for example, programme aid, 
including budget support, global funds, social funds, the rather general term 
‘projects’, and humanitarian aid. This is a broad category of often dissimilar, 
often overlapping, mechanisms, but follows conventional usage. ‘Frameworks’ 
are the mechanisms through which donors coordinate their analysis, 
strategies and disbursements, with each other, with recipient governments 
and with other actors such as the UN; it includes, for example, Common 
Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP), Transitional Results Matrices (TRM) and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). The notion of coordination, most 
commonly used in humanitarian and reconstruction contexts, is understood to 
be a kind of less rigorous precursor to harmonisation.  
                                            
3 One common way to estimate the level of fragility is derived from the World Bank’s Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessments (CPIA). CPIA scores divide low-income countries into five categories of 
performance, the lowest two of which are useful proxies for state fragility. There is a separate group of 
unranked countries, also deemed fragile. This provides a list of 46 fragile states, containing 870 million 
people or 14% of the world’s population. Middle-income countries are not included in this list. See also 
‘Fragile states: Defining difficult environments for poverty reduction’ DFID working paper, 2004, for a 
fuller analysis of state fragility. 
4 ‘Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states’, DFID policy paper, 2004.  DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  11
 
 
Working typology of aid frameworks and aid instruments 
National planning and budgetary 
framework 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP; iPRSP) 
Transitional Results Matrix (TRM) 
Strategic planning 
mechanisms, typically 
government-led and with 
varying degrees of donor 
influence 
Joint Needs Assessment 
Common Country Assessment 
Needs assessment 





Consolidated Appeals Process 
(CAP) 
Resource mobilisation and 
operational coordination, at 







Multi-donor Trust Funds 
Global Funds 
2. FINANCING & 
DELIVERY 
Humanitarian assistance 
Financing and operational 
instruments, with varying 
degrees of alignment to the 
state, and harmonisation 
with other donors 
 
This paper considers both frameworks and instruments as they are closely 
related, indeed it is sometimes hard to make a clear distinction, multi-donor 
trust funds, for example, can be seen as both an instrument and a framework. 
The choice of framework is also closely associated with the context (i.e. lack 
of state capacity and/or will) and the choice of instrument (the CAP and 
projects in humanitarian situations, PRSPs and direct budget support in 
development, for example). Both frameworks and instruments impact on the 
broader goal of maximising aid effectiveness through increased harmonisation 
between donors and alignment behind government plans and policies. 
Strategic planning and coordination mechanisms are considered in greater 
detail in a separate working paper.
5 
 
2.2  Aid effectiveness in ‘good performers’ and fragile states 
In countries with effective poverty reduction approaches, there is a relatively 
high degree of consensus between donor agencies over policies, instruments, 
ways of working, and principles of aid effectiveness. Donors are increasingly 
committed to harmonising and aligning behind country–led development 
approaches, with budget support emerging as the preferred instrument in 
support of these approaches, at least in aid dependent countries.
6 This model 
typically requires a national poverty reduction strategy, sound policies and 
institutions, and adequate financial management systems. These conditions 
are typically not met in fragile states; governments frequently lack a 
                                            
5 ‘Harmonisation and Alignment in Fragile States’, draft report by the Overseas Development Institute 
for the OECD, January 2005. 
6 Although ‘Programme Aid’ accounted for only 17% of UK bilateral aid in 2003/04, it is anticipated 
that this proportion will increase, particularly in the Africa region. DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  12
commitment to poverty reduction, and the capacity to implement a PRS if they 
are committed. Annexe 1 analyses the challenges of applying the aid 
effectiveness model developed for normal countries to failed states in more 
detail. 
 
2.3   Policy objectives in fragile states 
Challenges to the conventional model of aid effectiveness are underpinned by 
more fundamental challenges relating to the objectives of aid in fragile states, 
and appropriate entry points for aid. This paper identifies four broad and 
overlapping objectives of aid in fragile states. 
 
(i)  Meeting immediate needs and service delivery: emergency aid, 
support to livelihoods, and the delivery of essential basic services, in 
the short- to medium-term.  
(ii)  Building sustainable systems: development of formal and informal 
institutions, within and outside government, to formulate policy and 
deliver services in support of poverty reduction, over the medium- to 
long-term.  
(iii)  Supporting pro-poor domestic political reform: peace building, 
stabilisation, challenging or promoting state legitimacy, supporting 
local, national and regional 'drivers of change'. 
(iv)  ‘Good donorship’: effective and efficient aid, harmonisation and 
coherence, reducing transaction costs, managing fiduciary risk. 
 
Section 3 will review the use of aid instruments against these four objectives 
and Section 4 will summarise these findings. As will be summarised in section 
5, choices about the relative balance between these objectives will depend 
largely on the context and state capacity and will for poverty reduction. 
 
 
2.4   The ‘standard model’ for the selection of frameworks and 
instruments in fragile states 
The standard approach to the selection of aid instruments outlined in section 
2.2 above gives little guidance for working in fragile states; given low capacity 
and will as the starting point, the decision tree for choosing aid instruments in 
one widely cited work on the subject rapidly guides the reader to the fairly 
limited approach of policy advocacy, TC and projects.
7 This uninspiring menu 
is the norm and in the context of low capacity, low will and difficult 
development partnerships, the conventional approach to aid to fragile states 
has become: 
 
Poorly governed countries should not only receive less money, they 
should receive more of it as project aid, it should come with a shorter 
time commitment, should be focused on a narrower set of activities, 
and much of it should be distributed through NGOs.
8 
                                            
7 ‘The choice of financial aid instruments’, Foster and Leavy, ODI, 2001,  
8 ‘Aid Effectiveness and the Millennium Development Goals’.: pp1. S Radelet, 2004, emphasis added. DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  13
 
This ‘standard model’ also assumes that as a state moves along the transition 
from ‘fragile state’ to ‘good performer’, the types of instrument used will shift 
from humanitarian aid and project-based instruments to budget support 
instruments, in support of country-led processes thus: 
 
 





This model also emphasises policy dialogue and knowledge transfer through 
technical assistance, in order to persuade recalcitrant governments to 
reform.
10 Humanitarian aid is recommended as a way of working around 
rather than through the state.  
 
In terms of frameworks, the model assumes a similar linear progression from 
CAPs in conflict and emergency situations through Transitional CAPS, joint 
assessments and occasionally TRMs in post-conflict situations, through to 
PRSPs once the ‘normalisation’ process is complete. It assumes that a limited 
approach to coordination based around information sharing etc is the norm for 
donor action in difficult situations, moving to more ambitious levels of donor 
harmonisation and alignment further along the spectrum. As follows: 
 
 
  Conflict Reconstruction  Development 
Frameworks  CAP/CHAP CAPs,  joint 
assessments, TRMs 
(i)PRSP 
Instruments  off-budget emergency 
projects,      
off-budget recon 
projects, tech co-op, 
social funds, limited 










                                            
9 Diagram taken from ‘How should DFID respond to PRSPs?’, internal DFID discussion document, 
DFID 2002: p11 
10 ‘World Bank Group Work in Low Income countries under stress: A task force report’, World Bank, 
2002  DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  14
This model – effectively simply the reverse of the consensus on aid 
effectiveness for good performers – guides the aid instrument choices made 
by DFID and other donors.
11 Given the absence of substantive policy on 
poverty reduction in fragile states, at least until recently, the influence of this 
model is largely by default. In DFID the influence of the ‘standard model’ can 
be seen by comparing DFID’s choice of aid instruments in fragile states and in 
other countries. Figure 2 compares the differing proportions of various 
instruments for selected LICUS countries compared against ‘non-LICUS’ 
countries, note the higher use of humanitarian assistance and lower use of 
‘programme aid’ (budget support) in LICUS countries. 
 
 
Figure 2. UK bilateral aid, by instrument, to LICUS and non-LICUS countries  
























DFID Bilateral Aid to LICUS Countries* 2003/04 by 
Form of Aid
Grants and 





















*LICUS countries (2003 & 2004 'Core' and 'Severe') 
 
Source: ‘Statistics on International Development’, DFID  
 
 
The implications of the aid effectiveness consensus on aid to poor policy 
environments, the widespread acceptance of the ‘standard model’ for aid 
instruments, and perceptions of high risk and low returns for aid in fragile 




However, there is a growing consensus that this position is unacceptable:    
 
   Fragile states are often where poverty is worst and most intractable,
13 
and they are increasingly seen as threats not only to their own citizens 
but to their neighbours, and even to global security.
14 Collier and 
                                            
11 See, for example, ‘World Bank Group Work in Low Income countries under stress: A task force 
report’, World Bank, 2002; ‘Develoment Co-operation in Difficult Partnerships’, DAC, 2002. 
12 OECD DAC figures show that percentage allocation to the top 2 CPIA quintile countries rose from 
1996 to 2001, while percentage allocations to the bottom 2 CPIA quintile countries fell (Ref to aid 
allocation working paper). 
13 ‘How important are difficult environments to achieving the MDGs?’ DFID PRDE Working Paper 2 
14 ‘Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states’, DFID policy paper, 2005. DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  15
Chauvet, for example, find that a typical neighbour loses 1.6 
percentage points of their growth rate if their neighbour is a LICUS.
15 
 
   Some new research is increasingly challenging the current dominant 
view that aid is only effective in good policy environments and shows 
that aid has an impact on growth regardless of the policy 
environment.
16 And the current notion of absorptive capacity needs to 
be broadened to include non-state capacity.
17 
 
Taken together, these developments should lead to a reappraisal of aid 
allocation between good and bad performers. This will need to be 
complemented by a more sophisticated approach to the selection of aid 
instruments and frameworks in fragile states than the standard model 
currently offers.  
 
A key difference between the use of aid instruments in fragile states and in 
‘normal’ contexts, however, is that they are often used as one element of a 
broader political and military strategy. Indeed, in fragile states, non-aid 
instruments such as peace-keeping can assume greater significance in donor 
decision-making than aid, and can have a significant impact on poverty 
outcomes.
18 This is not to argue that aid should somehow be put at the 
service of political processes, rather that poverty reduction is in itself a 
strategic policy goal, and that achieving this requires an understanding of how 
aid and other interventions interact. Thus before examining the use of 
individual instruments in fragile states (section 3.2 below), it will be useful to 




                                            
15 ‘Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds’, Lisa Chauvet & Paul 
Collier, December 2004 
16 ‘Counting chickens when they hatch: the short term effect of aid on growth’, Clemens, A, Radelet, S, 
Bhavnani,, centre for Global Development, Working Paper 44, July 2004.  
17 ‘Aid allocation and fragile states’ Background paper for senior level forum on development 
effectiveness in fragile states, 13-14 January 2005, McGillivray, M. 
18For example, according to an IRC survey in eastern Congo in June 2004, there is ‘compelling 
evidence that improvements in security represent one of the most effective means to reduce excess 
mortality’ pp22 in ‘Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Rescue Committee, 
June 2004.  And according to Collier and Hoeffler, in a ranking exercise of different instruments for 
conflict prevention, external peace-keeping is far more cost-effective than aid. ‘The Challenge of 
Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil war.’ Collier and Hoeffler, 200 DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  16
3. REVIEW OF FRAMEWORKS AND INSTRUMENTS 
3.1  Frameworks for Strategic Planning and Coordination 
3.1.1  The purposes of frameworks 
 
Effective strategic planning and coordination is arguably even more important 
in fragile states than in traditional development partnerships, due to the 
complexity of political and development objectives and activities, and the 
fragmentation of actors on both the donor and partner side. This particularly 
applies to the difficulties in linking humanitarian, development, diplomatic and 
security concerns and so is a broader problem than the more limited concerns 
of harmonisation and alignment. 
 
Intervention by donors in most fragile states is governed, at least loosely, by 
some kind of overall framework. These frameworks are important for this 
discussion as the nature of the overall framework has significant implications 
for the nature of aid instruments and their relationship to other, non-aid, 
instruments. These frameworks aim to promote, in different combinations:  
 
   Aid coordination, (not only amongst donors but between humanitarian 
and development actors, and funding lines), 
 
   Strategic coordination and coherence (linking aid, political and military 
strategies to increase overall effectiveness), 
 
   Resource mobilisation, 
 




3.1.2  Examples of frameworks at country level 
 
There are a wide variety of these frameworks, they include: 
 
   Consolidated Action Plans (the ‘CAP’) produced by OCHA  
 
   ‘Transitional’ CAPs, sometimes produced by OCHA in post-conflict 
situations 
 
   The ‘strategic framework’ developed in Afghanistan under the Taliban 
 
   The Transition Result Matrix (TRM), developed by the World Bank in 
East Timor and Liberia 
 
   Peace agreements, which often have attached, either formally or not, a 
substantial reconstruction package, usually as a carrot to the parties to 
come to agreement, as in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
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   Joint assessments by multiple donors, often as part of a peace 
agreement, such as the JAM in Sudan.  
 
   Donor conferences, often after a peace agreement and joint 
assessment and intended to mobilise resources and coordinate donors 
behind a plan, as in Berlin for Afghanistan. 
 
   An overarching National Budget (e.g. in Afghanistan, where the budget 
was conceived as including most aid to the country, even if the monies  
did not go through the government) 
 
   (I)PRSPs. The standard in most normal situations, but present in a few 
fragile states as well, and a process governments often want to move 
to as quickly as possible after conflict as a kind of normalisation 
process and to access a wider range of funds. 
 
 
3.1.3 Donor  frameworks 
 
In recent years, a number of donors have also created new internal 
instruments intended to promote similar objectives within their own 
governments. These instruments are particularly focussed on post-conflict 
situations. Examples of these instruments would be:
19 
 
   Norway’s Gap fund, created in 2002, is intended to fill the critical 
resource gaps between acute emergency relief and longer- term 
development 
 
   The Dutch stability fund, crated in 2004, aims to provide rapid, flexible 
support for activities at the interface between peace, security and 
development in countries in or at risk on conflict. 
 
   The UK's Global Conflict Prevention Pool, set up in 2001, is an 
interdepartmental instrument that aims to improve effectiveness of the 
UK contribution to conflict prevention. It is managed by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. 
 
   The World Bank has recently set up two trust funds the Post conflict 




All these instruments reflect a desire amongst donors for greater flexibility and 
better integration of interventions, not only between relief and development, 
but between security and development. These developments also signal a 
greater concern amongst donors to develop instruments able to effectively 
intervene in areas of contested legitimacy and in the highly political process of 
                                            
19 From ‘Financing countries in protracted humanitarian crisis: an overview of new instruments and 
existing aid flows’, in ‘Beyond the Continuum’, ODI, 2004. DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  18
reform and state-building; the more ‘traditional’ instruments are built on either 




3.1.4 Aid  frameworks in practice 
 
Experience is mixed. However, joint assessment tools and ‘pre-PRS’ planning 
and budgeting frameworks such as TRMs, have the potential to promote 
harmonisation and alignment. 
 
   In East Timor, a Joint Assessment Mission between the World Bank, 
the UN, and the Timorese led to the creation of a prioritised set of 
policies and corresponding budget. The Timorese National Resistance 
Council further prioritised these policies, which donors financed through 
a Trust Fund, thereby aligning their assistance within a country-led 
development framework. 
 
   In  Sudan, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and 
International Partners (IGAD) includes the government, rebel groups, 
and international political and development agencies. A Joint 
Assessment Mission is seeking to develop policies to provide the basis 
of a Poverty Eradication Strategy, to be supported by donors, 
conditional upon the signing of a Peace Agreement. 
 
   In Nepal, the government has a PRS, and MTEF, and a PRSC, and 
has also created a Harmonisation Action Plan. However, some donors 
are peripheral to this plan, concerned about attributing specific 
outcomes to their own development activities. 
 
   In countries with weak national leadership such as Liberia and the 
Central African Republic, a Joint Assessment Mission has provided 
the basis for a ‘Transitional Results Framework’. Envisaged as ‘pre-
PRS’ plans, these frameworks aim to provide a government and donor 
roadmap for prioritisation, coordination and monitoring. 
 
   In the DRC, weak country leadership and the absence of substantive 
political dialogue with donors has meant that there is currently no 
integrated framework to plan, prioritise and link economic, social, 
























There is a prior political element to the choice of framework and so 
instruments; CAPs are the usual framework of choice with unpopular 
governments, PRSPs with popular.
20 This in turn has implications for whether 
instruments go ‘through’ the government, such as DBS or, substitute for 





The choice and design of strategic framework is also relatively ad hoc,
21 
despite the fact that the choice of instruments and budget lines by donors are 
often derived from the nature and content of the overall strategic framework. 
For example, CAPs will often mean a primarily humanitarian, project-led and 
characteristically not well coordinated set of choices by donors, with little 
harmonisation. Post-conflict joint assessments have led to multi-donor trust 
funds, such as in Afghanistan and now in Sudan, even if not that well 
subscribed to. And PRSPs of course signify a move towards donor confidence 
and budget support.  
 
The standard assumption is that there is a progression along the scale from 
‘fragile state’/bad performer, to good performer, with different frameworks 
being suitable at different times. In fact, frameworks are often simultaneous, in 
Afghanistan for example, there were transitional CAPs competing with the 
government’s budget.
22 There are also moves to make PRSPs occur earlier 
along the scale part of moves to make development instruments more 
accessible in difficult environments,
23 and through the transitional CAP and 
ECHO’s humanitarian plus fund, to take humanitarian spending further into 
reconstruction. This ‘everything all the time’ approach is paralleled by the 
development of the donors specific instruments mentioned above.  
 
                                            
20 “the decision about whether and how to engage will be driven as much by political concerns as it will 
by a technical reading of the process itself.” ODI: PRSP in conflict paper, p6 
21 ‘ Donor/IFI decisions tend to be taken on a case-by-case basis with only limited attention to 
consistency between them, in policy or in practice.’ ODI: PRSP in conflict, p10 
22 Ref to Harmonisation and Alignment working paper 
23 ‘Beyond the continuum: an overview of the changing role of aid policy in protracted crisis’, p7, ODI, 
2004 
Harmonisation and Alignment: some lessons from East Timor 
 
•  Financial mobilisation works best when donors work with a comprehensive
needs assessment that addresses the overlap of humanitarian assistance
and reconstruction financing, and establishes a link between recurrent and
development expenditures. 
•  A coordinated set of reconstruction benchmarks across political,
institutional, economic and social fields, together with frequent donor
meetings, helps to focus efforts and to maintain momentum. 
•  Trust Funds can improve coordination even when they channel less than
half the available reconstruction funds, but require specific coordination
efforts (such as joint donor missions) to achieve this impact. 
•  The budget provides the best anchor for government-led aid coordination;
specific capacity-building efforts need to be made early on, to develop a
budget that can function as the coordinating tool for a multiplicity of actors,
where all donors dialogue with the government, in a timeframe consistent
with the budget cycle, on the prioritisation of resources. 
 
Sources: ‘Harmonisation and Alignment in Fragile States’, draft report by the
Overseas Development Institute for the OECD, January 2005; ‘The East Timor
Reconstruction Programme: Successes, Problems, Tradeoffs’, World Bank, 2002DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  20
There are also significant issues of institutional competition in the choice of 
different frameworks that are not always in line with donor priorities.  
 
   The Bank promotes, TRMs and PRSPs, and Consultative groups,  
   The UN promote CAPS, CHAPS and round tables 
   Recipient governments promote their own budget/planning process 
 
 
3.1.5 Some  recommendations 
 
This brief review raises some areas for further investigation. The ODI Working 
Paper concludes by offering six recommendations: 
 
(i)  to improve alignment, donors should first ensure that they have a 
sound understanding of a country’s processes and systems, through 
undertaking the necessary diagnostics; 
(ii)  where possible, align donor activities to all stages of the government’s 
strategy, policy and implementation cycle, including its systems; 
(iii)  where alignment is not possible, harmonise in order to align; 
(iv)  selectivity and sequencing of interventions are critical; 
(v)  support policy making and aid management in the partner 
government; 




The paper also makes an important distinction between alignment behind 
polices and behind systems and structures, and so introduces the important 
notion of shadow alignment: 
 
 
‘Shadow alignment’ in fragile states 
 
“In some cases, donors are concerned that to align their policies with those of the recipient 
would unjustly legitimise a government. This is an important and very real concern. However 
the question of systems alignment may be addressed separately. Donors could explore the 
possibility of ‘shadow’ systems alignment, whereby donors work to be compatible with 
national systems without subjugating them to government priorities or policies. Possibilities 
include putting aid ‘on-budget’ but not ‘through budget’, working within existing administrative 
boundaries, and providing information to the recipient in terms that are compatible with their 
national systems such as the budgetary classifications and cycle…Shadow systems 
alignment is a state-avoiding approach but one that is ‘future-proof’.” 
 
Source: Harmonisation and Alignment in Fragile States, draft report by the ODI for OECD, 
January 2005  
 
 
In terms of the frameworks, could donors develop greater standardisation in 
terms of frameworks, in particular for the ‘gap’ area between humanitarian and 
development where there is most confusion and variation? The World Bank’s 
TRM, for example, provides an interesting and apparently useful way of DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  21
combining all aspects of intervention on one page in agreement it with the 
recipient government.  
 
Could the various instruments be reviewed and adapted to ensure they 
cohere together more successfully. For example, could CAPs be improved by 
more explicit reference to the type of poverty analysis and consultative 
process that standardly accompanies PRSPs? CAPs could probably also be 
improved by the application of harmonisation and alignment principles 
standard amongst donors with PRSPs to the CAP, and putting funds through 
multi-donor trust funds controlled by OCHA as opposed to a national treasury, 
for example. Another possible area of agreement across all instruments might 
be to focus the UN more on political and standard setting roles, and the bank 
on more technical, analytical and planning roles. 
 
In summary, there may be opportunities for harmonisation and alignment in 
situations where donors are currently content with the more limited goal of 
coordination, particularly through greater shadow alignment and more actively 
supporting the budget of fledging governments. This would be assisted by a 
set of frameworks that are better standardised, which reference each other in 
predictable and well understood ways, that can enhance the transitions 
between frameworks, and reduce unhelpful institutional competition. However, 
no strategic framework will be able to accommodate differing perceptions of 
strategic interest amongst donors or regional powers. And this is more likely to 
be the case in fragile states, where national interests are often perceived to be 




3.2   Programme Aid: Balance of Payments Support, Debt Relief, and 
Budget Support 
 
Description and statistics 
 
Balance of Payments Support consists of foreign exchange transfers to a 
central bank, in support of policy reform, and with limited accounting 
requirements. IMF financial support typically takes this form. Debt Relief is a 
form of balance of payments support that reduces the stock of obligations that 
government is expected to meet in the future.  Granting debt relief can be 
subject to conditionality (HIPC debt relief is linked to the adoption of a PRSP), 
but once granted it is irrevocable. General Budget Support refers to funds 
provided for the government budget, using government systems, with little or 
no earmarking. It supports a government programme typically focussing on 
growth, poverty reduction, fiscal adjustment, and strengthening institutions, 
especially budgetary processes. Sector Budget Support earmarks funds to a 
specific sector.  
 
Provision of ‘Poverty Reduction Budget Support’ (DFID’s brand name for 
budget support) depends on an assessment in three areas:  
(i)  the government’s budget supports poverty reduction; DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  22
(ii)   there is commitment to making the administrative, technical and 
financial systems robust and reliable; 
(iii)    provision of budget support will produce significant benefits 
relative to other forms of aid delivery (e.g. improved 
coordination, a more coherent policy and expenditure 
programme, and lower aid management costs). 
 
Given such criteria, fragile states can have difficulty accessing different forms 
of programme aid. This is due to donor judgements relating to: macro-
economic instability; weak policy, institutional, governance environments; 
unacceptable levels of fiduciary risk; the absence of enabling conditions, such 
as a PRS. Of the 34 countries classified by the World Bank as LICUS in 2004, 
8 had iPRSPs, 7 had full PRSPs, 10 had PRGFs, and one country had 
reached HIPC decision point.
24 The IMF has a facility to provide emergency 
assistance for post-conflict countries. Arrears clearance, paid directly to 
international financial institutions (IFIs), can also help those fragile states in 
arrears to access larger-scale concessional financing. DFID paid £12 in 
arrears clearance to support Afghanistan’s reengagement with the IFIs. 
 
In countries where there is little political will to invest in and account for pro-
poor expenditure, budget support instruments will remain inappropriate. 
However, in countries of ‘low-capacity / high will’, budget support has been 
provided, specifically in two kinds of circumstances: 
 
(i)  Budget support via Trust Funds in the early stages of state 
formation 
 
   In  Afghanistan, £395 million has been committed to the 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) for 2004/5; the 
ARTF has become the instrument of preference for donors and 
government, helping to insulate fiduciary risk but build 
government systems. 
   The multi-donor ‘Capacity Building Support Fund’ for the 
nascent administration in South Sudan covers recurrent costs 
of teachers, health workers and administrative staff; it has 
many of the properties of budget support, but in the absence of 
formal ‘government’ systems (this has been called ‘quasi 
budget support’). 
   In  Timor-Leste, the multi-donor Transition Support 
Programme (TSP), which included general budget support, 
established a basic framework for service delivery and 
institution-building at the early stages of state formation. 
 
(ii)  Budget Support, direct to government, in post-conflict countries with 
new regimes 
                                            
24 ‘PRS in LICUS, Phase 1 Report: Progress & Literature Review’, Nigel Thornton & Marcus Cox, 
2004. While debt relief is critical in reducing the government’s future obligations, it will only impact 
public expenditure in the short-term if the government is servicing the debt. HIPC debt relief to 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone has had a positive impact, resulting in increases in pro-poor expenditure 
(IMF tracking of poverty reducing public expenditure in HIPCs). DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  23
   In post-conflict Sierra Leone and Rwanda (see textbox), DFID 
adopted high risk strategies, moving quickly into instruments 
supporting government systems. The early shift to programme 
aid – combined with large increases in technical cooperation 
funding – enabled Sierra Leone and Rwanda to improve 
macro-economic stability, to rebuild institutions, to plan and 
prioritise public expenditure, and to meet key recurrent costs to 
support basic services. Traditional ‘post-emergency’ 
instruments may arguably not have been able to meet these 
broader objectives. In Sierra Leone, DFID provision of budget 
support during the conflict arguably contributed to economic 


































Pros and Cons 
 
Programme aid instruments can help fragile states free up a larger portion of 
the budget for discretionary pro-poor expenditure. The conventional 
arguments in favour of budget support are equally relevant to fragile states. 
UK aid to Rwanda – programme aid in a post-conflict context 
 
UK aid to Rwanda is a notable exception to the trend for overall aid to decline in the second
4-5 year period after a conflict (‘post-emergency; pre-development’). UK aid to Rwanda
peaked at £45m in 1994/95. This was almost entirely emergency aid. It fell to a low of under
£6m 4 years after the conflict. However in the period 1997/98 to 2000/01, UK aid rose from
under £6m to £33m, primarily through increases in programme aid. The provision of
budget support is considered as ‘high risk’, due to (i) weaknesses in financial management,
and (ii) controversy over Rwanda’s political transition and its influence over events in
neighbouring DRC. These risks have been mitigated through securing government
commitment to improvements financial management (supported by technical assistance,
and monitored through regular fiduciary assessments), and through policy
dialogue.
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The expected benefits of budget support (over projectised support) in the 
short-term include reduced transaction costs, improved government 
ownership, improved policy coherence, and a more rational allocation of 
expenditures. In the medium-term, it is hoped that budget support may result 
in increased predictability of aid flows and greater accountability of the state to 
its citizens. At present, however, there is little evidence to support these 
expected benefits. In ‘high will’ scenarios, budget support instruments 
(whether direct or via a Trust Fund), combined with technical assistance, are 
potentially a useful way to establish or sustain basic services and to build 
institutional capacity. In ‘low will’ scenarios, however, projects and externally-





Whether in ‘high will’ or ‘low will’ situations, high level of fiduciary risks in 
fragile states will require special attention, and may also mean that donors 
need to be prepared to accept a higher level of risk. Trust Funds provide one 
model of reducing risk in fragile states. 
 
Consideration should be given to reducing the conditions for accessing 
budget support (such as the requirement of a PRS), and to speed up the 
‘graduation’ from projectised to budget support. In post-conflict countries 
particularly, an accelerated transition to budget support instruments can help 
transfer resources quickly in the critical post-emergency-aid period, supporting 
government systems. Research on post-conflict countries suggests that 
growth peaks in the second four-year period after conflict, but, perversely, that 
this period is typically where external funding reduces.
25 (UK aid to Rwanda 
provides a notable exception). 
 
Sector budget support may have advantages over other forms of programme 
aid: (i) sector budget support can be used even if overall policy, budgetary 
and institutional frameworks are considered sub-optimal, provided that sector 
frameworks are viable, therefore isolating and reducing risk (ii) sector budget 
support may be used to cover key recurrent supply-side costs (e.g. salaries 
for teachers and health workers, school textbooks, essential medicines) that 
may complement demand-side financing provided through social funds and 
other instruments (iii) sector budget support may be used as a pilot and pre-
cursor to general budget support.
26 
 
Budget support is also likely to be a blunter instrument than projectised 
support. This may mean that a combination of instruments is preferable, 
including instruments that target specific geographical areas and population 
groups. 
 
                                            
25 ‘Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies’, Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2002 
26 There is also evidence to suggest that in post-conflict societies, social policies become increasingly 
important, relative to macro-economic policies (although donor priorities have historically prioritized 
the latter). Collier and Hoeffler conclude that in post-conflict countries, social policies and sectoral 
policies should be prioritised over macro-economic policies. DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  25
3.3   Technical Cooperation 
 
Description and statistics 
 
Technical Cooperation (TC), or Technical Assistance, is the provision of 
advice and/or skills, in the form of specialist personnel, training and 
scholarship, grants for research and associated costs. It covers a broad range 
of activities. It is therefore difficult to consider TC as a single ‘instrument’. TC 
accounts for over a quarter of global official development assistance. Global 
TC flows peaked in 1994 at around US$16 billion, and have since fallen back. 
Nearly three quarters of bilateral TC is provided by the USA, Japan, Germany 
and France.
27 TC accounted for 35% of DFID bilateral aid in 2003/04, and 














DFID bilateral aid in 2003//04 – breakdown of Technical Cooperation (35%), (Source: 
‘DFID Statistics on International Development 99/00 – 03/04', 2004) 
 
TC can take two forms (i) investment related TC, related to a project (ii) stand-
alone TC. In recent years, TC’s effectiveness has been increasingly 
challenged. Most TC is still accountable to and procured by donors rather than 
partner countries. The emerging paradigm, however, is for developing country 
governments to procure and managing advisory services themselves, 
preferably through pooled TA accounts, and preferably on budget. Such 
arrangements usually require reasonably functioning government systems.
28 
The absence of a stable or credible government in many fragile states means 
that TC is typically managed by external agencies. Externally managed TC 
can be harmonised through pooled TC funds. To varying degrees, it can also 
be aligned (or shadow aligned) to support the systems and develop the 
capacity of government.  
                                            
27 ‘A Vision for the Future of Technical Assistance in the International Development System’, Gareth 
Williams, Stephen Jones, Val Imber & Astrid Cox (Oxford Policy Management), 2003. 
28 See e.g. ‘The Pooling of Technical Assistance: An Overview based on Field Research Experience in 
Six African Countries’, Heather Baser & Peter Morgan, 2001; ‘A Vision for the Future of Technical 
Assistance in the International Development System’, Gareth Williams, Stephen Jones, Val Imber & 
Astrid Cox (Oxford Policy Management), 2003. DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  26
 
TC accounted for 14% of UK bilateral aid to FY05 LICUS countries in 2003/04 
(against 35% for all countries), and 24% to the same countries over the period 
1993/94 to 2003/04. Countries affected by conflict average around 20%. In 
conflict-affected countries where development partnerships are weak, TC is 
the natural corollary for emergency aid, with the two sometimes accounting for 
over 90% of the portfolio.
29 In post-conflict countries where more effective 
government-donor partnerships have developed, TC also averages 20%. 




The highest proportion of TC in DFID’s aid to LICUS countries is seen in 
countries characterised by high corruption, poor governance and difficult 
government-donor relationships; e.g. for 2003-04, Nigeria (76%), Georgia 
(52%), Cambodia (51%). In these countries, ‘influencing’ and ‘knowledge 
generation’ are seen by DFID as key development strategies, with TC as a 
significant channel for resources. This reflects a use of more ’projectised’ 
instruments, outside of government management. 
 
The World Bank Group LICUS strategy also foresees a strong role for TC, 
proposing that in LICUS countries, ‘knowledge-based’ instruments may be 
more appropriate and significant than lending operations.
31 
 
Pros & Cons 
 
TC is likely to remain a key aid instrument in fragile states to help build human 
and institutional capacity, particularly when used in conjunction with other 
instruments. This may apply particularly to building basic state functions, such 
as policy and budget formulation, and public financial management. In post-
conflict situations such as Afghanistan and Timor Leste, where state 
institutions may need to be entirely re-constituted or built for the first time, 
human and institutional capacity can be built in non-state institutions, with a 
view to transferring to state institutions as they are built up. TC can also be 
used to strengthen non-governmental organisations and the private sector. 
The World Bank LICUS strategy points to the potential of the Bank’s private 
sector financing arm – the International Finance Corporation – to help build 
small and medium enterprises through TC attached to small financing 
packages. 
 
However, TC also has the potential to seriously undermine state functions. A 
World Bank evaluation in Cambodia noted that annual funding for technical 
assistance by donors in Cambodia exceeded the government’s budget for civil 
                                            
29 From 1993/94 to 2003/04, UK aid to Liberia was dominated by emergency aid (73%) and TC (19%). 
The same pattern can be seen for Somalia: emergency aid (74%) and TC (18%). 
30 See e.g. Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Rwanda, Ethiopia, where a wider range of instruments have 
been used. 
31 ‘World Bank Group work in Low-Income Countries Under Stress: a Task Force Report’, World 
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service salaries.
32 Pooling TA funds, preferably under government 
management, can be one answer to this problem, helping to rationalise the 
quantity and functions of TA. A recent ODI report suggests that a more 
fundamental reform of TA is needed, calling into question the efficacy, costs, 
management arrangements and internal incentives of Western technical 
assistance provider.
33 The report also recommends finding better 
mechanisms for ‘South-South’ learning from countries that have managed 
successful transformations. 
 
The emerging empirical evidence on TC also questions the circumstances in 
which TC is effective in helping fragile states to achieve ‘turnaround’. Recent 
research has suggested that TC has little impact if there is no prior political 
commitment, and no demand for it.
34 Chauvet and Collier confirm this finding, 
questioning the conventional LICUS strategy, and particularly the 
effectiveness of TC in leveraging reform.
35 They conclude that technical 
assistance is only useful when it is provided to governments that want and 
need to use it, but that under these circumstances, it can be very useful. 
 
Results of regression analysis to determine the impact of technical assistance 
and other kinds of aid on improving policies and institutions in LICUS 
countries 
 
“Technical assistance has no discernable effect until after a turnaround has clearly 
begun. Before that it appears to be a waste: it is not a precondition for reform. 
However, once there are clear signs that the government has itself embarked upon a 
turnaround, rapid technical assistance is a highly effective form of aid, increasing the 
chances that the incipient reform will progress to a substantial and sustained 
improvement and reducing the chances of relapse. But technical assistance can be 
excessive and it can continue for too long. Around 4% of GDP appears to be the right 
amount of technical assistance in early reform environments, although this will 
obviously have to be nuanced by the particular circumstances. If the incipient reform 
does not progress towards a sustained turnaround after around a decade, the case 
for continued technical assistance is weakened, although it still plays some role in 
averting complete relapse.” 
 
Source: ‘Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds’, 




The following design considerations emerge: 
   where possible, TC should be pooled, and identified and managed by 
government; 
   the use of more local consultants should be considered, to help build 
national capacity, and ‘South-South’ learning mechanisms; 
                                            
32 World Bank OED Evaluation quoted in ‘PRS in LICUS, Phase 1 Report: Progress & Literature 
Review’, Nigel Thornton & Marcus Cox, 2004 
33 ‘Harmonisation and Alignment in Fragile States’, draft report by the Overseas Development Institute 
for the OECD, January 2005 
34 ‘Aid and Reform in Africa- lessons from ten case studies’, World Bank Group, 2001 
35 ‘Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds’, Lisa Chauvet & Paul 
Collier, December 2004 DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  28
   donors should not expect TC to influence changes in policies and 
institutions; 
   donors should react rapidly with TC for countries demonstrating 
political progress; 
   the supply of TC should be organized by donor agencies in such a way 
as to be highly responsive to changes in development circumstances; 
   the evaluation of technical assistance needs to take into account that it 
is intrinsically a high risk investment, characterised by frequent failure, 
but occasional high returns. 
 
 
3.4   Projects  
 
Description and statistics 
 
‘Project or sector aid’ accounted for 23% of UK aid to LICUS countries in 
2003/2004, compared to 14% for UK bilateral countries excluding LICUS. The 
nature and design of projects vary greatly, and definitions are not consistent.
36 
For the purposes of this paper, ‘projects’ are defined in opposition to budget 
support instruments, as externally financed discrete interventions, with some 
degree of removal from government systems and management. Projects are 
often seen as the default instrument in fragile states: 
 
Projects may be the only way to provide support to poor 




Degrees of alignment to national and local government systems are almost 
infinitely variable, and projects can be adjusted to accommodate different 
contexts and different development objectives. 
 
   Projects offer a way of working in difficult development partnerships, 
to provide access to public goods: the Social Marketing of 
Insecticide Treated Nets
38  in Kenya is a project implemented by 
Population Services International (PSI), designed to increase the 
use of ITNs among pregnant women and children under 5. At the 
time of project approval, UK relationships with the Government of 
Kenya were poor, and social marketing was seen an effective way 
of increasing the coverage of a public good without subsidising a 
non-reforming government. The social marketing approach also 
supported the national malaria strategy without putting extra 
pressure on an already over stretched health system. 
                                            
36 Even within DFID, interpretations of what constitutes a ‘project’ are not consistent. The 
category ‘project or sector aid’ can comprise both conventional projects (excluding technical 
cooperation) and sector budget support (including, in this case, technical cooperation). 
37 ‘The Choice of Financial Aid Instruments’, Mick Foster and Jennifer Leavy, ODI, 2001 
38 Marilyn Mc Donagh Health Adviser, DFID Kenya, October 2004; ‘Improving the 
Development Response in Fragile States: Lessons from DFID Experience’, DFID, December 
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   Projects can work effectively with weak governments, to 
compensate for low capacity: In Somalia, the World Bank has 
partnered with the Red Cross and local health authorities in the 
Community Health Service Recovery Project
39 to address critical 
gaps in health service coverage. The project has established a 
network of integrated health clinics, with an explicit strategy to 
reduce funding over time. The project seeks to reduce dependence 
on international assistance, while building a system of ‘community-
management’, increasingly aligned to national and regional health 
authorities 
 
   NGO projects can help provide services, working with a range of 
partners and funding modalities: Working with the Ministry of 
Health, Marie Stopes Society Sierra Leone (MSSSL) provides 
reproductive health care services including safe motherhood and 
obstetrics care, basic curative and preventive primary health care 
services and community health promotion. MSSSL also provides a 
programme of training for NGO and government health workers, 
traditional birth attendants and youth educators. MSSSL is an 
implementing partner in the World Bank funded Sierra Leone 
HIV/AIDS Response Programme, and will lead two components of 
the national Global Fund HIV/AIDS programme. 
 
   Projects can work on a regional basis, to influence political 
relationships: the South Caucasus Parliamentary Initiative
40 (SCPI) 
is a small project with regional political impact. In partnership with a 
small British NGO (LINKS), international donors have brought 
together parliamentarians from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to 
improve relationships between the three countries. The international 
community has played an ‘honest broker’ role, providing seed 
funding to bring previously distrustful governments around the table. 
 
   Projects can also catalyse policy and institutional reforms: In 
Mozambique, the UNCDF Local Development Fund
41  has 
supported the delivery of locally managed services, and contributed 
to building accountability in local government. Its spillover effects 
include convincing government of popular participation, multi-
sectoral programming, and district-level planning. The model piloted 
in one province has been encoded in law, for extension to other 
provinces. 
 
                                            
39 World Bank LICUS Initiative 
(http://www1.worldbank.org/operations/licus/Innovativeelements) 
40 Dennis Sammut (LINKS); ‘Improving the Development Response in Fragile States: Lessons 
from DFID Experience’, DFID, December 2004 
41 ‘Decentralized District Planning and Finance in Nampula Province, Mozanbique’, Felix Pius 
Kulipossa and James Manor, paper commissioned by the WB LICUS Initiative, 2004 DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  30
Pros and Cons 
 
Projects can allow donor agencies to work through a range of implementing 
partners and contracting arrangements. The use of external management 
agents, as opposed to government institutions and systems, can also help 
limit fiduciary risk. Project interventions can also be better targeted than, for 
example, budget support, both geographically and in the scope of services 
that they finance. 
 
The main argument against projectised support is that it is not sustainable. 
Projects may produce island of excellence, but can have little longer-term 
impact, particularly if they are dependent on providers and systems outside of 
government. Recent empirical research has also questioned the degree to 
which projects are in fact isolated from poor policies and institutions. Isham 
and Kaufmann argue that the productivity of projects may be strongly 





Foster and Leavy distinguish between three kinds of project aid: (i) projects 
using government systems, (ii) projects using parallel systems, and (iii) 
projects using NGO / private providers. A recent ODI report
43 makes a similar 
distinction between projects that are: (i) ‘through budget’ (government 
budgeting and delivery systems), (ii) ‘on budget’ (government budgeting but 
alternative delivery mechanisms), and (iii) ‘off budget’ (alternative budgeting 
and delivery systems). Degrees of alignment to government systems are 
typically determined by the extent to which these systems are judged to be 
legitimate, efficient, effective, and with adequate financial management 
controls. The choice of implementer, and the degree of alignment to the state, 
should be determined by these judgements, and the degree to which state-
building is an explicit objective in the short- or medium-term. Discrete biltateral 
projects are increasingly giving way to co-financed and pooled arrangements, 
as a means to reduce transaction costs, expand coverage, and potentially 
increase government oversight. Joint programmes and pooled funding 
arrangements are explored later in this paper. 
 
3.5   Social funds 
 
Description and data 
 
Social funds originated in the late 1980s as a emergency measures to 
alleviate the impact of structural adjustment programmes and economic 
shock, but have since evolved in may directions and the term now covers a 
                                            
42 ‘The forgotten rationale for policy reform: the productivity of investment projects’, J.Isham and 
D.Kaufmann, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 1549, 1995 
43 ‘Harmonisation and Alignment in Fragile States’, draft report by the Overseas Development Institute 
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wide variety of designs.
44 They range from social assistance projects to the 
provision of block grants to communities to be spent on micro-projects 
selected by the community, but which have to meet certain criteria (both 
process criteria, and design criteria). Social funds are growing in popularity 
generally,
45 and are increasingly being used in fragile state contexts, in 
particular post-conflict as part of a broader reconstruction strategy.
46 There 
have been few formal evaluations of social funds in fragile states, but the 
results of a number of less formal reviews indicate that they can be a useful 




Pros and cons 
 
Advantages of the approach that can make them appropriate in the context of 
fragile states are: 
 
   They can be effective mechanisms for delivering small-scale 
infrastructure and because they are demand-driven can promote both  
allocative efficiency and sustainability. 
   They can help form or reform relationships between families and 
communities and communities and local government to make both 
local government and local community structures more efficient, 
participatory and democratic.  
   They can help enhance state legitimacy, in that grants are seen as 
coming from the state. In particular as entitlements are the same 
nationwide, and not dependent on local NGO decision-making as often 
occurs.  
   They can cope with a wide variety of village contexts, important in, for 
example, post-conflict.  
   They offer a coherent framework for national coordination of donors, 
even though they work very locally, in contexts where donors are often 
uncoordinated and prone to using parallel structures. 
   They can stimulate the private sector, which can be important 
especially post-conflict. 
   And as national programmes they can absorb quite large budgets in 
areas where donors often consider it is hard to spend money. 
 
                                            
44 See ‘Social funds: an effective to support local action for poverty reduction?’ de Haan, A, Holland, J, 
Kanji,N, Journal of International Development Volume 14, Issue 5, Date: July 2002, Pages: 643-652 
for a review. 
45 There are no figures for DFID contributions to social funds, but the World Bank increased funding 
from USD2.4bn for 66 projects in 42 countries at the end of 1999 to USD3.5bn for 98 projects in 58 
countries by May 2001 [source].   
46 See for example what the World Bank calls ‘Community-Driven Reconstruction’ 
47 This section draws on a number of sources, in particular ‘Community Driven Reconstruction as an 
instrument of war to peace transition’, Cliffe, Gugenheim and Kostner, World Bank, 2003; a series of 
unpublished case studies commissioned by the LICUS unit of the World Bank under the banner of 
‘Making aid work in fragile states’, including studies of social fund-type programmes in Cambodia, 
Uganda, Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone; DFID experience of the Social Fund for 
Development in Yemen, see ‘Improving the development response in difficult environments: lessons 
from DFID experience’, PRDE Working Paper 4; and ‘From subjects to citizens’, Besen, I, 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, 2004, a study of the NSP in Afghanistan. DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  32
There are of course a number of risks associated with social funds in fragile 
state contexts: 
 
   elite capture and diversion, can be a particular risk if communities 
are weak or divided; 
   the potential for undermining the state by the creation of parallel 
structures is a common objection of social funds;  
   a number of social funds started of life as smaller, local projects that 
have been scaled up to a national or regional level. Scaling-up has 
presented a number of problems, in particular finding the right number 
of qualified staff to facilitate at the local level;  
   in some circumstances, it has been argued that social funds are too 
politicised and are in effect an election tool for particular party and 
have been intended to generate support for that party as opposed to 
legitimate the state or build local governance;  
   being excessively donor driven and focused on project outputs and 





There is a wide variety of project design, variables and issues include:  
 
   The nature of community governance: Some sort of community 
council is common with social funds. How this is elected depends on 
what is possible in local context, with possibilities ranging from secret 
ballot elections, as in the NSP in Afghanistan, to specifying stakeholder 
groups. Community councils are sometimes part of formal government 
structures, or are informal, but have links to local government 
structures.  
 
   The relationship with government structures: This is a key design 
issue, at both central and local level, and will depend in great part on 
the will and capacity of government to engage in poverty reduction and 
to permit a degree of devolving of authority to communities. Various 
configurations are possible; in the NSP in Afghanistan the Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development contracts out programme 
oversight to an international organisation, who then contracts NGOs as 
facilitating partners. In Sierra Leone a commission separate from 
government was established, in effect a kind of large PIU, to avoid 
corruption and inefficacy. The Selia programme in Cambodia is run 
through government, but is off-budget. It is particularly important that 
local government has a role to ensure that, at a minimum, officials do 
not block the programme. More positively, officials can also promote 
and protect a programme.  A stronger role for local government can 
reduce the danger of creating parallel structures, but on the other hand 
can also reduce the scope for real participation by communities.  
 
   The need for basic conditions to be in place:
 social funds have been 
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such as Afghanistan and northern Uganda. However, there are 
probably some minimum conditions that need to be in place, in 
particular security and some kind of identifiable, territorially-based 
community are necessary. If basic administrative infrastructure, such 
as a payments system, is not in place, implementation will be slow.  
 
One of most attractive features of social funds seems to be the combination of 
a strong, simple, central concept, with a high degree of design flexibility that 
allows adaptation to local context; many social funds in fragile states have 
evolved through several stages of learning and re-design.   
 
Social funds can thus play a role in meeting immediate needs, especially 
reconstruction needs post -conflict, primarily because they are demand driven. 
However they are probably not as rapid a mechanism as humanitarian action. 
In terms of developing capacity and systems, sensitive design can 
minimise the danger of parallel structures, but in cases where existing 
systems are very weak or hostile, parallel systems can in fact be useful. They 
can also contribute to improved local participation and governance. And in 
that they use pooled funding, they can promote donor harmonisation.  
 
 
The National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan 
 
Two decades of war in Afghanistan has left most infrastructure in ruins and local governance 
structures dominated by local commanders. The removal of the Taliban and the political 
settlement reached at Bonn in January 2002 meant that reformers took control of some key 
ministries. Though political will for poverty reduction was thus high in some parts of 
government, and the removal of the Taliban unleashed a wave of optimism throughout the 
country, government capacity was very limited. The National Solidarity Programme (NSP), 
was designed as a key part of the reconstruction process. Through a facilitated local 
institution building process and cash grants directly to communities from government, it is 
intended to assist communities rebuild assets, promote better community governance, and 
provide a new model of the relationship between state and citizen. 
 
Communities elect a community development council (CDC) through secret ballots. The 
community is then responsible for designing and implementing projects, for which each 
community receives training on procurement and financial procedures and then a block grant, 
based on population size but with an upper limit $60,000. The programme is managed by an 
oversight consultant contracted by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. 
Work at community level is undertaken by facilitating partners under contract to the ministry. 
Donors contribute to the programme as a whole.  
 
The programme is fairly new so evaluation is tentative, but early findings are that the NSP has 
dramatically raised the amount of money spent by communities on reconstruction, it has 
contributed to changing village perspectives on the central state, the CDCs are widely seen 
as legitimate and democratic local governance structures that offer a viable alternative to the 
commanders, and in many places have facilitated better involvement for women in decision-
making.  
 
3.6   Joint programmes and pooled funding 
 
An evolving and as yet fairly undefined and unexamined ‘instrument’ is the 
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programmes or agencies. The joint programme on HIV/AIDs in Burma is a 
good example, as are the basket funding of NGOs in Zimbabwe or the 
National Priority Programmes Afghanistan.  
 
The Joint programme to tackle HIV/AIDS in Burma operates as a national 
programme, with the participation of government and funding from a number 
of donors, despite generally hostile relations between Burma and the 
international community. It also brings many other actors NGO and civil 
society, to the table. The UN plays a key role as a kind of neutral intermediary 
between donors and government and administers the fund. The fund is used 





The National Priority Programmes (NPPs) in Afghanistan, by contrast, operate 
in a context of generally good donor/government relations, clear government 
leadership, but weak government capacity. The twelve NPPs offer donors a 
way to pool money in government priority programmes. The National 
Emergency Employment Programme, for example, is controlled by the 
Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development, but managed by a special 
programme implementation unit staffed by internationals and Afghans paid 
considerably more than the normal civil service salaries. It is implemented 
around the country by NGOs and private sector engineering firms. Such an 
approach can obviously suffer from the drawbacks commonly associated with 
project implementation units in other contexts; however in fragile states 
contexts where capacity is very weak, this may be an acceptable risk to take. 
 
Pooled funds and joint programmes are innovations that can offer donors the 
advantages of national strategies and approaches, but localised 
Joint programme for HIV/AIDS: Myanmar 2003-2005 
 
The joint programme for HIV/AIDS in Myanmar provides a coordination framework for all
development stakeholders (state and non state) working on HIV/AIDS in Burma, including
the National Aids Programme and several other government departments. A multi-donor
fund (the FHAM) has been established to finance projects identified by the joint
programme. UNAIDS and UNDP play a key role in coordinating and managing the joint
programme and the fund. The joint programme and the FHAM have attracted an
increased level of resources, they have been efficient at disbursement (70-75% of 7
million spent in the first year) and have made possible a national response at scale. The
following lessons can be drawn: 
 
•  the UN has a comparative co-ordinating advantage in situations where bilaterals
cannot work directly with government as it is seen as a legitimate interlocutor by
all parties; 
•  continuous dialogue with government is important, but it does not guarantee
policy change in key enabling areas; 
•  alternative structures for overseeing service delivery are fragile and liable to
collapse if strong leadership is not maintained; 
•  major new funding early on is essential to fuel momentum; 
•  corordination is a challenge as it may be difficult to convince non-state
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implementation. As the Burma and Afghanistan examples show, they can be 
positioned closer or further away from government structures depending on 
context. They offer opportunities to increase donor harmonisation and in the 
long-term my be easier to be absorbed into government policy and structures 
than collections of projects as often characterise, for example the heath sector 
in humanitarian situations.  
 
3.7   Multi-donor trust funds 
 
Description and data 
 
There are a wide variety of trust funds in use; there are three broad categories 
of MDTFs that have been used in fragile states: 
 
   Funds for post-conflict reconstruction, 
48  
   Funds for humanitarian response, 
49  
   And funds for security sector reform.
50 
 
Most trust funds are country specific, but some are global (e.g. the Central 
Emergency Reserve Fund), and some regional (e.g. the Great Lakes DDR 
programme). Details of governance arrangements vary, but typically involve 
an administrator, usually the World Bank, OCHA or UNDP, and a supervisory 
council of donors.  
 
Trust funds are less well developed in the humanitarian phase,
51 but are 
receiving growing interest as well as a mechanism for improving coordination 
and ensuring, better resource allocation, and better funding according to 
need, a key commitment of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative. 
 
 
Pros and cons 
 
There is increasing interest in MDTFs as they can: 
 
   raise money: The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust funds for 
example, has gone from $185 million in 2002 to  $395 for 2004. 
However, to be attractive to doors, funds need to be able to balance 
allowing donors to claim their funds are going to things they approve 
and the precluding strict earmarking 
                                            
48 Post-conflict MDTFs have been established for the West Bank and Gaza, Bosnia, Kosovo, East 
Timor and Afghanistan, Iraq. And most recently for Sudan?? 
49 Emergency trust finds have been set up by OCHA for Angola and DRC. OCHA also manages a 
global facility intended to speed up response of UN agencies, the Central Emergency Reserve Fund 
(CERF), but this requires agencies to reimburse funds after they have received money from donors.   
50 Security sector MDTFs include for example the financing of DDR programmes as in Sierra Leone 
and the multi-country DDR fund for the Great Lakes, and the UNDP managed Law and Order Trust 
Fund for Afghanistan that paid for police salaries and equipment.  
51 But see speech by the Secretary of State to ODI, London, 15 December, 2004 for proposals for an 
OCHA-managed joint fund. DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  36
 
   coordinate donors: Funds can improve donors coordination and 
harmonisation behind a government plan or budget, allowing 
government priorities and plans to lead decision-making 
 
   ensure more equitable and efficient resource allocation: Funds can 
be useful in ensuring that less attractive projects or areas are financed. 
They can also promote more predictability of funding for recipient 
government recurrent expenses.  
 
   reduce transaction costs: A single fund with a single set of reporting 
and procurement procedures can considerably reduce transaction 
costs on both weak post-conflict governments and in emergency 
situations where the alternative is multiple negotiations between 
agencies and bilateral donors.  
 
There are some shortcomings with trust funds;  
 
   the most common criticism is slow disbursement. DFID has 
withdrawn money from the Sierra Leone and Great Lakes MTDFs.
52  
 
   some donors have legal problems that restrict their ability to pool funds 
in trust funds as they do not allow sufficient earmarking and thus 





For reconstruction trust funds a recent World Bank review
53 concluded, inter 
alia, that the key strategic criteria for a trust fund to fulfil its executive function 
are; 
 
   An agreed programme of reconstruction activities,  
   Ownership by both government and donors,  
   Transparency, 
   Citizens voice.  
 
A realistic and comprehensive government budget is the best way of meeting 
these criteria. The review also concluded that an MDTF can cover most civil in 
expenditure, including salaries and pensions, operations and maintenance, 
non -project TC, and investments except very large flagship projects, and that 
there should be a presumption in favour of an umbrella fund as opposed to 
specific ones. It also recommended that an agent should be hired to verify 
payments and transactions to minimise fiduciary risk.   
 
 
                                            
52 Mansfield – check.  
53 ‘Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-Conflict situations’. Schiavo-Campo, S, 
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3.8   Global Funds and Partnerships 
 
Description and statistics 
 
A Global Fund or Partnership (GFP) is an initiative that transcends national 
boundaries and involves a group of (public / private) participants working 
towards a specific global development goal. GFPs support a number of 
functions, including research and development, capacity building, advocacy, 
technical assistance, and financing. It is estimated that DFID has invested 
over £900m in 65 GFPs since 1988, with the largest investments being in 
environment, health, infrastructure and education.
54 GFPs can be classified 
according to four primary objectives: 
 
   to enhance the performance of national sector programmes in order to 
deliver national development goals (e.g. Education Fast Track Initiative; 
Global Environment Facility); 
   to attract, manage and disburse additional finance such as private 
sector funds to increase levels of aid in pursuit of the MDGs (e.g. 
Global Fund for Aids, TB and Malaria; Business Link Challenge Fund); 
   to generate new strategic thinking and advocacy to achieve the MDGs 
(e.g. Global Water Partnership; Global Health Forum); 
   to develop new products and technology to deliver global & national 
public goods (e.g. Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research; Medicines for Malaria Venture). 
 
 
It is difficult to reach general conclusions about GFPs, due to the diversity of 
their structures and functions. However, they have the potential to: 
(i)  generate global public goods; 
(ii)  maintain service delivery in the absence of credible government 
channels; 
(iii)  channel resources to ‘donor orphans’; 
(iv)  provide a platform for working in politically difficult environments.
55 
 
A recent evaluation of health GFPs in Sierra Leone concluded that the seven 
active health GFPs have provided indeed additional funding, but that their 
effectiveness is limited by the structural weaknesses of the national health 
system.
56 Transaction costs, including additional reporting, are also high. The 
evaluation recommends streamlining country coordination mechanisms, 
increasing levels of technical assistance, and complimenting GFP assistance 
with health system strengthening. 
 
                                            
54 ‘Global Funds & Partnerships – Mapping Exercise Report’, Performance Assessment 
Resource Centre, September 2004. 
55 [experience from the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and malaria on how to minimise the risks of 
working in weak policy environments – Billy Stewart] 
56 ‘Global Health Partnerships Assessment, Sierra Leone Country Case Study’, Cindy Carlson 
& Jennifer Sancho, August 2004.  DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  38
How might the Education ‘Fast Track Initiative’ (FTI) support progress towards 
Education MDGs in Fragile States? 
 
•  FTI is a multi-donor global partnership which aims to harmonise donors behind country-
led plans, and raise additional resources in support of the education MDGs; FTI includes 
an ‘indicative framework’ to assess country sector plans as a quality assurance 
mechanism. 
•  FTI includes multiple facilities within the initiative: FTI funding, mainly through bilateral 
channels for endorsed countries with credible sector plans embedded in PRSPs; 
Catalytic Fund for countries with credible plans but limited donor support, to accelerate 
their education progress and galvanize longer-term donor assistance; Education 
Program Development Fund to help weak countries put together good sector plans. 
•  FTI can channel financial support through different frameworks and instruments (e.g. 
trust funds, budget support, projects), decided at the country level through a donor 
consortium working with government. 
•  FTI has the potential to increase resources available to fragile states, with the 
additionality of increased harmonisation, (shadow) alignment, and quality assurance. 
•  FTI partners are committed to explore options for the expansion of FTI to fragile states 
in 2005.  Initially the Education Program Development Fund is tasked with exploring 
ways of working in fragile states.  The Catalytic Fund will also explore how it can 
develop the flexibility to disburse funds to countries where government institutions and 
alternative actors play a central role in education service delivery. 
 
Pros and Cons 
 
Some GFPs are able to give profile, financing and operational support through 
targeted vertical programmes. Some may generate global public goods that 
may be beneficial to fragile states (e.g. vaccines, agricultural research). At the 
global level, they have the potential – although it is difficult to say if this borne 
out by evidence – to contribute to a more rational allocation of financing. 
Perhaps most significantly, their potential lies in channelling relatively large 
volumes of financing through different disbursement mechanisms and 
providers, including non-state providers
57. 
 
However the more operational GFPs also have the potential to distort national 
priorities, increase transaction costs, and create separate planning, financing 
and delivery channels. Their appropriateness for fragile states will depend on 





Attention should be given to ensuring that: 
   GFP priorities are indeed the priorities of the state or country with 
whom they are working; 
   GFPs do not create large additional transaction costs, through, for 
example, parallel management and procurement systems; 
   GFPs are flexible enough to join pooled funding and implementation 
arrangements, and to use appropriate providers. 
   GFPs are able to align to state systems, where appropriate. 
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DFID is currently reviewing GFPs, with a view to producing guidelines for 
engagement in 2005.
58 
3.9   Humanitarian assistance 
 
Description and data 
 
Humanitarian assistance is a popular instrument in fragile states, for DFID and 
for other donors. But it is different from other instruments in that it is more a 
way of working, in tat it has a specific limited set of objectives (usually around 
life-saving) and its own set of ‘humanitarian principles’, which are contained in 
international humanitarian law. From 1999-2001, donors on the DAC allocated 
about $5.5bn a year to humanitarian aid, around 10% of ODA. If others 
sources are included, such as money from western publics to NGOs and aid 
to post-conflict peace activities, the figure doubles to 10bn. Global 
humanitarian aid has grown, both in overall terms and as a share of aid.
59 
Much of this humanitarian aid goes to fragile states.
60 From the graph in 
section 2 it can be seen that in 2003/04, humanitarian aid was the single 
largest DFID instrument in LICUS countries at 34%, whereas the proportion is 
11% for non-LICUS countries.  
 
Humanitarian assistance is a popular choice for two broad reasons. Firstly, 
countries suffering from conflict and bad government are more likely to 
produce humanitarian disasters, and less likely to respond to them effectively. 
And secondly, humanitarian aid is often used by donors as a way of by-
passing the state in badly governed countries. Indeed some donors 
deliberately reclassify as humanitarian activities that would in other contexts 
be development in order to circumvent polices or laws that forbid development 
work in countries with, for example, bad human rights records.
61 In many 
circumstances, the distinction between chronic poverty and humanitarian 
need will always be blurred, but the choice of instrument should not blur the 
analysis of the nature of poverty.  
 
 
Pros and cons 
 
There are two reasons why humanitarian action has a tendency to become 
the catch-all solution in fragile states.  
 
   Firstly, humanitarian actors are often the only external aid actors 
present, in particular during high-profile emergencies. Humanitarian 
agencies are used to working in instability and insecurity and have 
                                            
58 Aid Effectiveness Team and Global Health Partnerships Team. 
59 ‘Global Humanitarian Assistance’, Development initiatives, p 1, 2003.  
60 For the years 1995-2001, ten countries received just under half of all humanitarian aid: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Palestine Administrative Area, Kosovo, Iraq, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Sudan, Angola, 
Ethiopia, and Jordan. Source: ‘Global Humanitarian Assistance’, Development initiatives,  2003.  
61 ‘Financing countries in protracted humanitarian crisis: an overview of new instruments and existing 
aid flows’, Randal, J, in ‘Beyond the Continuum: the changing role of aid policy in protracted crises’, 
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developed security and management procedures to minimise risks to 
staff. Together with donors, agencies have evolved flexible and rapid 
funding instruments and procedures. Humanitarian agencies can thus 
often access populations and provide services and social protection 
when other agencies - government, NGO, or UN - are unable to do so.  
 
   Secondly, in the ‘humanitarian principles’ of neutrality, impartiality and 
independence, humanitarian actors have an ethical framework that 
assists them in navigating the moral minefield of working with or 
alongside warring, hostile or incapable authorities, state or non-state. 
This can mean that they are less likely to be co-opted than 
development actors that tend to assume state legitimacy. The 
humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence also mean, as 
pointed out above, that humanitarian agencies will often operate 
‘around’ the state. This provides donors with a means of working in a 
country without working through or with the government, for example in 
Afghanistan under the Taliban, or in Zimbabwe currently, where that 
would be politically unacceptable, even if needs are not strictly 
‘humanitarian’. The humanitarian approach to health in particular has 
defined it as a ‘neutral’ space in which otherwise warring parties can 
occasionally come to an agreement. The normal paradigm for this is 
the work of ICRC during conflict, but the HIV/AIDS programme in 
Burma shows that this ‘neutral’ characteristic of health interventions 
can be expanded beyond conflict and can bring donors and an 
otherwise isolated government to the same table. 
 
However, this largely ad hoc adaptation of the humanitarian instrument to 
address poverty reduction in fragile sates also has significant drawbacks. 
What is often, in effect, long-term chronic poverty requiring long-term service 
delivery and social protection is redefined as humanitarian need as that is the 
instrument being used. Thus in many situations of chronic instability, 
supposedly rapid response short-term agencies have been providing services 
for a decade or more. This is unhelpful conceptually and administratively, for 
the following reasons: 
 
   Humanitarian assistance is often short-term, in culture, staffing, and 
funding arrangements, whereas poverty reduction in fragile states 
requires a long-term approach. 
   It is also tends to be highly projectised, local and difficult to coordinate 
resulting in a patchwork of service provision and differing entitlements, 
depending on a series of separate negotiations between individual 
donors and agencies.  
   The humanitarian approach also resists engagement with the state and 
capacity-building on the grounds that it breaches humanitarian 
independence and neutrality, whereas a long-term approach to poverty 
in fragile states requires engagement with the state and in particular 
capacity-building.  
   And the range of instruments that humanitarians habitually use tend to 
be limited and often commodity driven, whereas a broader, more 
flexible social protection approach may be more suitable.  DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  41
 
The resistance of these issues to resolution is demonstrated by the 
persistence of calls over the last decade or so for a better-managed 
‘humanitarian to development’ transition. The reason for this obstinacy is that 
what the seemingly reasonable demand for a smooth transition fails to take 
into account is that a number of these issues are inherent to the nature of the 
instrument itself. It is contradictory, for example, to expect an instrument 
designed to work around the state, and that is frequently used by donors for 





The design of humanitarian projects is a large issue that can only be dealt 
with in passing here. But a more effective relationship between humanitarian 
and development funding will require a recognition of what is negotiable as it 
were, and what is not.  What humanitarians do, in terms of local service 
delivery, providing welfare safety nets etc, can be improved to promote both 
greater effectiveness and an easier transition. There is nothing inherent to 
humanitarian action about the use of food aid, for example, and the use of 
cash-based social protection may be both more efficient for poverty reduction 
and more transferable to longer-term, government-run safety nets.
62  How 
humanitarian agencies work however, in particular in terms of their 
independence from both donors and local administrations, is less susceptible 
to change, and capacity-building of state systems, for example, will always be 
something that humanitarian agencies will be wary of with given the principle 
of neutrality.  
 
The funding of humanitarian action also could be substantially reformed. At 
the moment the project-based pattern of competition between agencies and 
multiple donor-agency contracts means much humanitarian response is 
fragmented and un-strategic. Greater use of pooled funding and more trust 
funds could enhance response, and ensure it is more impartial, programmatic 
and strategic.
63 A second issue is the tendency for humanitarian fund raising 
mechanisms such as the CAP to compete with government-led initiatives 
post-conflict.
64 The recent proposals by the Secretary of State on reform of 
the humanitarian system would move the system in this direction.
65 
 
In short, humanitarian aid is a good instrument for meeting immediate needs 
and to an extent longer-term needs, but much less good at developing 
sustainable systems. It’s fragmentary nature and the independence of 
humanitarian agencies also makes it an instrument that donors find it difficult 
to align and harmonise behind.  
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4. MEETING DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES 
 
This section draws together the conclusions in section 3 about the extent to 
which the various instruments can meet the four policy objectives laid out in 
section 2. 
 
4.1 Meeting  immediate  needs and delivering services 
The standard model arranges aid instruments in fragile states along a 
spectrum from relief projects implemented by agencies at one end to budget 
support to government at the other. The strengths and weaknesses of each 




Strengths:   flexible,  responsive,  community-focussed, able to work in 
insecure environments, can work outside government where government is 
weak or unwilling, high accountability to donors. 
 
Weakness  fragmented, lack of strategy and common analysis, undermines 
state, makes harmonisation or alignment by donors difficult, high transaction 





Strengths:  promotes harmonisation behind government leadership, low 
transaction costs, very strategic, high disbursement. 
 
Weaknesses: little control over implementation, weak government capacity 
makes implementation uncertain, high fiduciary risk. 
 
In other words relief projects and budget support are a mirror image of each 
other in terms of their strengths and weaknesses. But to work better in fragile 
states, we need instruments that combine the advantages of both, 
instruments that are specifically designed for use in ‘transitions’ or ‘grey 
areas’, contexts where state capacity and legitimacy is doubtful and 
changeable. In other words instruments that are strategic in approach, but 
ensure effective project level implementation, and which promote 
harmonisation and alignment amongst donors. It is probably more important 
that instruments in fragile states are average along all three dimensions 
rather than good at some and bad at others. 
 
Some of the most promising instruments in this respect from recent 
experience in a number of countries seem to be social funds, CDD 
approaches, and joint programmes using multi-donor trust funds. This is an 
ungainly set of instruments without a common name but they seem to be able 
combine the strengths of both ends of the spectrum. They can take a national 
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and strategy, identical entitlements across a whole country, and donor 
coordination, but at the project level they have strict rules for grant allocation 
and project implementation, often based on criteria that ensure high levels of 
community involvement in project selection and planning, and often rely on 
contracting out to NGOs and the private sector.  
 
These instruments can be ‘positioned’ closer to government (for example the 
Seila programme in Cambodia which is off-budget, but implemented through 
state structures) or further away (for example the HIV/AIDS programme in 
Burma which is implemented by largely by NGOs but central government is 
represented in overall planning) depending on context and the nature of 
government. They are often in effect parallel systems, but in that they are 
national they could be moved back to state control more easily than the 
fragmented project level approach of relief projects. They a similar to the idea 
of Independent Service Authorities, which is based on the success of 
Independent Revenue Authorities.
66 Achieving shadow alignment would be 
easier for this type of programme than for the more usual a projectised 
approach to social protection. In that they work on a national scale and have 
multi-donor backing, they can also disburse quite large sums of money 
compared to the project approach, but as it is through parallel systems 
implementation can be better controlled.  
4.2  Building sustainable systems 
Building sustainable systems for poverty reduction in the long-term is 
particularly difficult in fragile states as this above all other objectives requires 
at least political will, if not capacity. Objectives must be realistic given difficult 
and predictable contexts. However, there would seem to be greater 
opportunities here as well. The experience of direct budget support with weak 
but committed post conflict regimes in, for example, Afghanistan is broadly 
positive. Similarly, the provision of technical cooperation in these contexts too 
has bee sow to e effective.
67 MDTFs have been useful as a means for 
providing DBS, and the idea of a ‘Technical Assistance Account’ would also 
provide a mean of both promoting greater harmonisation and alignment with 
weak but committed governments.  
 
In fragile states however, it may be that the lest worst option for building 
systems is to work with non-state actors or instruments that mix state and 
non-state in innovative ways, CDR programmes for example, can promote 
local planning and accountability as well as strengthening NGOs and the 
private sector.  
 
4.3  Supporting pro-poor political reform  
Promoting pro-poor political change is perhaps the most difficult objective, but 
it is till possible. In some contexts some aid instruments can make this task 
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more difficult, (e.g. a projectised approach can reduce state-citizen 
accountability and build parallel systems, budget support can legitimise bad 
governments, and allow them to spend more on conflict). But some aid 
instruments can contribute (‘drivers of change projects’; South Caucasus 
example; DBS in Rwanda and Afghanistan strengthening hand of reformist 
government; project support to ‘zero generation’ governance and 
accountability reforms; TC supporting reformers in Uganda). 
 
The choice of instrument needs a sophisticated political economy analysis, 
donors need to examine how different aid instruments are likely to influence 
the bargaining process between actors in the country, rather than seeing 
recipient governments as unitary agents to be manipulated with carrots and 
sticks.
68 The choice of aid instrument also needs to be part of and coherent 
with broader strategies (development-diplomatic-security mix). However, 
there are potential problem if these broader political strategies are not pro-
poor. 
 
At the strategic level, there is a need for further work to develop and 
standardise frameworks such as the TRM that allow joint donor and recipient 
government planning across all sectors, including political and military, and 
that can reduce the institutional competition between different actors.  
 
4.4 Good  donorship 
One of the primary lessons of the aid effectiveness debate, that the quality of 
aid matters as much as the quantity, is just as relevant for fragile states, 
maybe more so. The forces against harmonisation and alignment are often 
more powerful in fragile states:  
 
   the range and number of instruments and actors (aid and non-aid) is 
greater than in ‘normal’ situations,  
   some of the instruments used in fragile states mitigate against 
coordination by their nature (project-level aid and humanitarian aid 
especially) 
   and there is a lack of strong, legitimate government leadership. 
 
But so are the arguments for it: 
 
   Absorptive capacity is low, and is made worse by unharmonised and 
unpredictable aid, it is even easier to overwhelm a fragile state 
government than in other circumstances 
   political pressure for reform from donor governments requires high 
levels of coordination to avoid recipients playing governments of 
against each other, 
   as many people are closer to the edge of survival, the costs of failure 
are higher, 
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   and the arguments about transaction costs etc, apply equally to 
relations between donors and UN/non-state-actors as to between 
donors and recipient governments. 
 
More importantly, there are greater opportunities for harmonisation and 
alignment in fragile states than may often be understood, in particular through 
using the notion of shadow alignment.
69 Achieving this depends in part on the 
instruments that donors choose to use, and some instruments seem to 
promote harmonisation and alignment more than others. The various types of 
pooled funding – MDTFs, social funds and joint national programmes – can 
all promote harmonisation, and to a lesser extent alignment, whereas project-
based and humanitarian aid can play heavily against it. It would also seem 
that technical cooperation should be more demand driven than is often the 
case in fragile states, the type of ‘Technical assistance account’ 
recommended by Collier and Chauvet could provide an opportunity for 
greater donor harmonisation and alignment behind recipient priorities. 
 
These conclusions can be presented in tabular format thus: 
                                            








Political reform  Good donorship 
Pro  Government has quick 
access to un-earmarked 
funds, which it may channel 
to meet immediate needs, 
dependent on policy choices 
and capacity (ARTF in 
Afghanistan; TSP in Timor 
Leste) 
More predictable revenue 
helps government control 
fiscal policy better; can 
build capacity and 
insulate fiduciary risk 
when channelled through 
Trust Fund (e.g. Timor 
Leste, Afghanistan, 
Sudan) 
Can help legitimise 
state and political 
process; better macro 
economic. stability can 
lead to better social and 
political stability 
Strong on alignment; 




Con  Can be slow, blunt 
instruments; unlikely to 
provide quick, targeted, 
flexible responses to urgent 
needs; capacity problems. 
No guarantee that it will 
lead to improvements in 
policies & institutions; 
fiduciary risk 
Government 
determines use of 
funds, so unlikely to 
support other 
reformers; fungibility 
(military spending may 
make conflict worse) 
Predictability depends on 
use of conditionality (e.g. 
DFID budget support to 
Rwanda currently 
suspended) 
Pro   Can be quick, targeted and 
flexible. 
Can support systems 
development, particularly 
when linked to TC 
Can help catalyse 
reform directly; or 
indirectly through 
demonstration effects 
of alternative ways of 
working 
Project aid can be aligned 
and harmonised, but it may 




Con  My be driven by external 
and national, rather than 
local, interests 
May rely on external 
management agents; can 
focus on delivery, rather 
than long-term institution 
building 
Excessive external 
influence and control 
may limit involvement in 
domestic  reform 
processes 
Much project aid is not well 




Pro  Can provide additional 
finance for a range of 
instruments, including 
service delivery instruments 
Research, advocacy, TC 
functions may help build 
systems and capacity; 
potentially useful 
demonstration effects of 
alternative service 
delivery 
Potential to influence 
political / institutional 
reform through policy 
dialogue, advocacy 
Some GFPs are being 
oriented to support country-
led approaches (e.g. FTI, 
GFATBM) DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  47 
  Con  Many GFPs not designed for 
this; earmarking limits 
flexibility 
Risk of creating parallel 
structures and high 
transaction costs 
Little evidence on 
supporting political 
change; most GFPs not 
designed for this 
Risk of creating parallel 
structures and high 
transaction costs 
Pro  May be useful if used with 
other instruments. 
May be very useful to 
support policies and 
systems development 
post ‘turnaround’; can 
play a role in averting 
‘relapse’. 




TC can be provided on-
budget, aligned or shadow-




Con  Designed for advisory 
services, rather than service 
delivery. 
Recent evidence 
suggests not effective 
without government will 
and commitment; 
diminishing returns in the 
mid- to long-term. 
Unlikely to help 
catalyse change within 
government; not 
effective without 
government will and 
commitment. 
Frequently donor-driven; 
may be  unpredictable. 
Pro  Could be used to promote 
rapid, more coordinated 
response 
Can be focus for DBS, 
with supervision and TC 
to reduce risk and 
promote capacity building 
Widely used for DDR.   Promotes harmonisation, 




Con  Fear that too slow and 
cumbersome 
    
Pro  Demand driven means meet 
community needs 
Can strengthen local 
participation and planning 
Can promote local 
accountability 
Pooled funding promotes 
harmonisation. If outcomes 




Con  Can be slow, requires 
facilitation, and existing 
community  
Can lead to parallel 
structures 
Elite capture could 
reinforce local power 
holders 
 
Pro  Rapid, good access, can 
work around state, can 
secure ‘neutral’ space 
Can support state 
institutions 





Con  Short-term focus, 
commodity-driven 




Not usually relevant  Project focus and 
competitive fund-raising 
can encourage or justify 
lack of harmonisation 
Pro  National and strategic 
approach more possible 
Can engage with gvt, or 
be led by gvt  
 Promotes  harmonisation, 
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5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This section will first make some comments on the use of the ‘standard model’ 
for the selection of aid instruments, outlined in section 2 above, present some 
recommendations as to how the standard approach can be modified, and 
suggest some changes to donor institutions that could facilitate this. 
 
5.1   Problems with the ‘standard model’ 
 
To recap, the current ‘standard model’ for the choice of aid instruments in 
fragile states advises: 
 
   Less money, and for shorter time periods, 
   Policy dialogue rather than money, 
   Projects rather than budget support 
   NGOs rather than state implementers, 
   And humanitarian aid and agencies over development. 
 
And assumes that as a state moves along the notional spectrum from ‘fragile 
state’ to ‘good performer’, there will be a shift from project-based humanitarian 
aid through NGOs at one end of the spectrum to budget support at the other. 
 
It is hoped that this review of the actual use of instruments has demonstrated 
that, while this model may be useful as a ‘default’ starting point for discussion, 
it does not capture the reality of what is actually happening, nor provide a 
complete picture of the range of possibilities for the creative use of different 
instruments in fragile states.  
 
For example:  
 
   Budget support can be very useful in some fragile states if sufficient 
safeguards are put in place (Afghanistan);    
 
   Innovations such as the NPPs in Afghanistan or the joint HIV/AIDS 
programme in Burma show that it is possible to develop instruments for 
national service delivery projects in even the most inauspicious of 
places; 
 




   And humanitarian aid may avoid the state but is not suitable for long-
term service-delivery or capacity building. 
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In good performers, the primary motive behind the selection of aid 
instruments is to support local ownership and strategies for PRS, and the best 
instrument for this is budget support. But in fragile states because of the 
complexity of the situation and the multiplicity of objectives there is a much 
looser association between instruments and objectives. In other words the 
standard model’s ‘approved’ instruments (humanitarian aid, NGO projects) 
are not always as useful as they are meant to be, and its ‘unapproved’ 
instruments (budget support, social funds) are not as bad. Reality, naturally, is 
much more complex than the standard model will allow. The reality in fragile 
states is that donors are likely to be using a large range of instruments all at 
same time, rather than use a predefined set of instruments that change 
according to how a state moves along some kind of notional spectrum with 
different instruments at each end.  
 
Thus, assuming the proportion of humanitarian aid as a proxy indicator for 
state capacity and legitimacy, and referring back to the ‘standard model’ 
diagram in section 2.1, DFID’s experience shows that whereas some fragile 
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Therefore, in most fragile states, rather than choosing instruments according 
to their position on a notional continuum of performance, a broad mix of aid 
instruments will be appropriate. For example, In DRC, DFID’s current 
programme includes supporting immediate needs through humanitarian aid, 
policy frameworks for poverty reduction through a multi-donor Trust Fund, and 
political transition through technical assistance to the Ministry of Justice, 
pooled funding for elections support, and project funding through UNDP to 
NGOs. 
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One problem with the standard model is that it is based on the assumption 
that fragile states are moving simultaneously along three linear processes, 
each producing a ‘gap’ or ‘transition’ or ‘grey area’. These are from: 
 
   relief to development,  
   poor performer to good performer, 
   and war to peace. 
 
These transitions tend to be unhelpfully conflated (e.g. through the use of 
humanitarian aid as ‘state-avoiding’ aid, rather than in response to 
humanitarian need), but they are not in fact the same. And experience shows 
that change in fragile states is not linear;
71 states can perform well and badly 
at the same time in different policy areas (Afghanistan), can perform well in 
some regions and not others (Uganda, Sri Lanka), and can go backwards 
(Zimbabwe).  
 
Whereas most current instruments and architecture are designed for each 
end of the various spectrums, the ‘grey area’ or ‘transition’ is in fact the 
predominant focus for intervention. This leads to a tendency to ‘bodge’ 
instruments for aims and contexts they were not meant for (humanitarian aid 
as a means of long-term service delivery, TC as a means of generating 
support for reforms); not surprisingly, they often fail to deliver. What is needed 
is a set of instruments and an architecture that is designed specifically for the 
transition. That this has been the case for some of the CDR projects, social 
funds and joint programmes backed up by MDTFs discussed above, may the 
account for their relative success.  
 
A second problem with much of the instrument discussion in fragile states is 
that it is often presented in terms of the ability of the instruments to work 
‘through’ (budget support) or around (humanitarian aid) the state. This 
dichotomy is over-simplistic and not very helpful. Governments in fragile 
states are rarely homogenous, and reformers and pro-poor constituencies will 
exist both within and without the state. Increasing absorptive capacity in weak 
policy context will require using whatever mechanisms are available, be they 
government, civil society or private sector, and combining them in an overall 
programme. This is why many of the most interesting instruments in fragile 
states in fact rely on a mix of state, civil society and private sector.  
 
Both these ways of thinking are not helpful in the selection of instruments in 
fragile states. Rather, there is a need for flexibility and to select and design 
instruments according to objectives and context rather than to preordained 
notions of suitability; one of the implications of this review of instruments is 
thus to stop thinking in terms of instruments. 
 
The standard approach also does not reflect recent research and 
understanding of aid effectiveness. In particular, it does not accommodate the 
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possibility that aid could be a cost-effective means of preventing conflict and 
further instability, nor the negative consequences of instability for 
neighbouring countries. It also assumes absorptive capacity is limited to 
governments, and does not include other actors. 
 
The following table presents the analysis according to the  state capacity and 
will understanding to fragile states used in this paper. DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  53
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5.2   Emerging lessons 
 
There is still much to do in terms of learning more about the use and selection 
of aid instruments in fragile states, however from the review above it is 
possible to point to a few emerging lessons:  
 
There is no single approach: Fragile state contexts are too varied, and 
opportunities too specific; development actors should avoid ‘one size fits all’ 
proscriptions such as  ‘budget support is inappropriate in fragile states’ or ‘civil 
society organisations are the answer’. Experience in a growing number of 
cases shows that a focus on context and policy objectives, combined with an 
imaginative and flexible use of various instruments, can have a significant 
impact on poverty reduction.   
 
Risk can be reduced, but not eliminated: Concerns over state legitimation and 
fiduciary risk will continue to be a strong determinant of the choice and 
balance of aid instruments in fragile states. For this reason, instruments that 
limit state control and fiduciary risk – such as humanitarian aid, technical 
cooperation and projects – will remain key. Minimum conditions for budget 
support will typically not be fulfilled. However, trust funds, pooled funding and 
social funds are being used in innovative ways that can manage these 
concerns, and also meet other objectives such as meeting immediate needs, 
institutional development, and political change. A ‘venture capital’ approach is 
needed that acknowledges high risk, but high returns. Public communication 
on aid in fragile states may also need to be reviewed; as aid is inherently 
more risky in fragile states, more will be ‘lost’ and diverted than in normal 
contexts, but the returns should be greater in terms of stability and security. 
Publics in donor countries may need to be convinced that aid with higher risks 
is not ‘wasted’.  
 
Think nationally and programmatically, not in terms of projects: Service 
delivery and social protection are important as preservers of human capital. 
But rather than think in terms of ‘scaling up’ from a series of local and 
projectised approaches, it is important and often possible to think and plan 
programmatically from the outset, and then work out implementation 
methodologies. The National Priority Programmes in Afghanistan, for 
example, are based on national plans, with implementation through 
government, NGOs and private sector depending on what is available.  
 
Programme implementation will involve many actors, state and non-state: 
Programme implementation will typically involve partnerships between state, 
UN, civil society and the private sector, not one or the other; this makes them 
complex, but flexible. It is impossible to avoid the state, and anyway not 
sensible if the long-term goal is to rebuild it. Programmatic approaches, as 
above, are more likely to be successfully absorbed by the state in the future 
than localised and projectised approaches, in particular if programmes are 
designed with this in mind. As the Burma HIV/AIDS programme shows, it is DRAFT working paper for discussion only - not UK government policy  55
possible to engage with the state even in the most inauspicious 
circumstances.  
 
Improved coherence requires better frameworks.  Greater coherence between 
security, development and diplomatic interventions matters, and this will 
require better and more standardised strategic frameworks. The choice of 
framework is closely related to the nature of aid instruments and frameworks 
such as Consolidated Action Plans and Transition Result Action Matrices 
have been developed to prioritise and plan donor interventions in the absence 
of developed state planning structures. But frameworks are often too ad hoc, 
too unrelated, and there is often competition between institutions as they 
champion different approaches. 
 
Contrary to convention, the use of aid instruments in fragile states can 
promote principles of aid effectiveness. Coordination is no substitute for 
harmonisation and alignment. A number of instruments, notably multi-donor 
trust funds and pooled funding for joint programmes, offer opportunities for 
greater levels of harmonisation, predictability, and where possible alignment, 
than are currently achieved. The Zimbabwe multi-year Protracted Relief 
programme, for example, aims to ensure predictability through multi-year 
funding. Even in the most difficult cases it should be possible to ‘shadow align’ 
with state systems, if not government polices.  
 
Supporting political reform is difficult but possible: The choice of instruments 
should be based on broader political strategies and a political economy 
analysis of potential winners and losers. Budget support though a trust fund in 
Afghanistan, for example, supported the legitimacy of a weak government 
after the Taliban and supported the restoration of state systems and capacity 
development. 
 
Experiment: Instruments are developed to meet objectives; SWAps and 
budget support have been developed in recent years as more traditional 
instruments did not deliver on newer policy objectives that stress local 
ownership. Working in fragile states requires experimentation and flexibility 
based on local knowledge. Many of the most interesting instruments now 
being used have evolved through several cycles of reform and adaptation. 
This requires a long-term commitment, good monitoring and evaluation, 
money and above all dedicated staff. One way of encouraging the 
development of new instruments may be to put up the money first, rather than 
wait for the instruments to be developed. Donor organisations also need to put 
in place better incentives to attract good quality staff to work on fragile states, 
and for much longer periods of time.
72 This will ensure the higher levels of 
experimentaion and local knowledge on which creative solutions depend. 
There is also a need for greater clarity about reporting on instruments to the 
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DAC to enable donors to better analyse instruments they are using. In 
particular humanitarian aid is often under-analysed and has very different 
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Annex 1: Challenges to applying the emerging consensus on 
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Principles of Aid 
Effectiveness
73 
Challenges in applying principles of aid effectiveness to 
‘fragile states’, as opposed to ‘good performers’ 
1. Country ownership & 
leadership 
Fragile States may lack capacity and/or will to deliver core 
state functions, particularly for the poor 
2. Budget alignment with 
PRS 
Fragiles States may not have an established budget or 
budgetary process, or may have a budget that donors would 
not want to support; most lack PRSPs (see 6.). 
3. Delivery through 
effective institutions 
Fragile States are likely to have ineffective institutions (low 
capacity) and/or institutions that lack legitimacy (low will) 
4. Results orientation  Capacity may not be there to measure and account for results 
5. Aid allocation focused 
on the poorest 
‘Poverty-efficient’ aid allocation criteria limit fragile state 
eligibility for aid; as a proportion of global aid, allocations to 
fragile states has reduced. 
6. Donor policy alignment 
with PRS 
Of the 34 countries classified by the World Bank as LICUS in 




Fragile states can be characterised by multiple instruments, 
delivery and reporting systems, and poor frameworks for 
coordination (policy and programming); harmonisation can be 
harder, but not impossible. 
8. Aid which is 
predictable and untied 
Insecurity and political instability may lead to disruptions in aid 
flows, and increased use of conditionality by donors (see 9.). 
9. Aid conditions minimal 
and based on country 
policies 
In ‘low will’ countries, a disjunct between government and 
donor policies and priorities may result in an increased use of 
conditionality by donors; ‘low capacity’ countries may struggle 
to formulate sound policies; ‘low will’ countries may have 
policies that are not considered by donors to be pro-poor. 
10. Aid instruments 
strengthen accountability 
to citizens of developing 
countries 
Chains of accountability between citizen and state can be 
weak or non-existent. 